|
Program
description / Law
| FMS by country | Most FMS agreements
| Program
description |
Law |
| The
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program manages government-to-government
purchases of weapons and other defense articles, defense services,
and military training. A military buying weapons through the FMS program
does not deal directly with the company that makes them. The Defense
Department serves as an intermediary, usually handling procurement,
logistics and delivery and often providing product support and training.
FMS
should be distinguished from the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
program, which oversees sales between foreign governments and private
U.S. companies, and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
program, which provides grants and loans for FMS and DCS purchases.
Security
Assistance Organizations (SAOs), military
personnel stationed at U.S. embassies, promote the sale of U.S.-produced
defense items and carry out most tasks associated with managing
FMS "cases," or agreements to make a sale. SAOs advise
foreign defense ministries on potential military purchases, often
by coordinating "security assistance
surveys" to assess perceived needs and occasionally by
aiding the development of procurement plans.
A possible
FMS case begins when a foreign government requests "price and
availability data" (P&A data) on the U.S.-produced items
it is interested in purchasing. The SAOs in the embassy cannot provide
this data unless the State Department, through its Bureau of Political
and Military Affairs, issues its approval. Without this approval,
an FMS sale will not proceed any further.
If
the State Department approves, P&A data are provided to the
purchasing government, which then decides whether to buy the items
through the FMS program or another source, such as the DCS program
or another country. An implementing agency within the Pentagon --
the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, or Defense Logistics Agency, depending
on the type of item being considered -- negotiates the terms of
the sale. If agreement is reached, both parties sign a letter of
offer and acceptance (LOA), the contract which sets an FMS "case"
in motion.
Once
an LOA has been signed, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA), a Defense Department agency that
oversees security assistance programs, buys the item or items from
U.S. manufacturers. This purchase normally goes through Defense
Department procurement channels, and may not happen quickly; the
time lag between an LOA and a delivery can take a year or more,
particularly for complex weapons systems. The price quoted in the
LOA may not match the cost of the items upon delivery, though in
fact most final prices fall below the original estimate.
The
U.S. government applies a 3 percent "administrative surcharge"
to all FMS sales. An additional 3.1 percent "logistics support
charge" is applied on certain spare parts, equipment modifications,
secondary support equipment and supplies. These surcharges recuperate
some of the costs incurred while promoting and managing sales of
commercially-manufactured U.S. weapons. FMS surcharges pay a significant
amount of the salaries and operating costs of Security Assistance
Organizations (SAOs) and other Defense Department personnel who
carry out the program.
FMS
versus DCS [1]
Though
the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program
tends to be speedier and less transparent, purchasing governments
may choose FMS for several reasons.
- Countries
desiring closer military-to-military contact with the United States
will opt for an FMS sale. Contact between military officers occurs
in all stages of the sale, and in many cases while providing follow-on
training and support.
- FMS
sales are often less expensive, particularly for more advanced
items. When purchasing items from manufacturers, the Pentagon
frequently combines its own orders with its requests on behalf
of foreign governments. This can result in lower prices through
economies of scale despite the FMS surcharges.
- FMS
sales often carry guarantees of U.S. service and training.
- Countries
with limited experience in negotiating complex procurement contracts
find FMS convenient, as the Pentagon negotiates with the arms
manufacturer and handles the paperwork.
- Because
FMS sales are publicly recorded, at least to some extent, countries
may opt for this channel to show they have "nothing to hide."
High-tech
arms sales
As
noted above, a purchase of high-tech weaponry normally goes through
the FMS program. In 1997, the U.S. government lifted a twenty-year-old
"ban" on sales of high-tech weapons to Latin America.
Under this policy, the State Department had made clear that it would
issue automatic denials to Latin American requests for price and
availability data on high-tech weapons.
In
March 1997, the policy was softened to allow Chile to request P&A
data on fighter aircraft. In August 1997 the ban was lifted altogether.
In 2002, Chile agreed to purchase ten F-16 fighter aircraft through
FMS.
|
The
FMS program is regulated by the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-269,
or the AECA), as amended. In order to purchase weapons through FMS,
countries must meet all the eligibility requirements
contained in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control
Act.
Notification
and congressional power to disapprove
According
to section 36(b) of the AECA, Congress must be notified of U.S.
government intention to offer an LOA if the items to be sold are:
- Defense
articles or services valued at $50 million or more;
- Design
and construction services valued at $200 million or more; or
- Major
defense equipment valued at $14 million or more.
["Major defense equipment" means any item on the
United States Munitions List
with a research and development cost of at least $50 million or
a total production cost of at least $200 million.]
This
notification must specify:
- The
foreign country or international organization to which the offer
is being made;
- The
dollar amount of the offer and the number of defense articles
offered;
- A
description of the defense article or service being offered;
- The
U.S. agency (or branch of the armed forces) making the offer;
and
- If
construction and design services are being offered, a description
of the facilities to be constructed.
If
the Speaker of the House, House International Relations Committee
or Senate Foreign Relations Committee requests it, the President
must "promptly" submit a statement
with additional information.
Within
30 days after receiving this notification, Congress may prohibit
the sale by enacting a joint resolution.
Reports
Every
February, the President must submit to Congress a report, known
popularly as the "Javits report," which includes:
- An
Arms Sales Proposal listing all probable Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) exports
for the current calendar year that exceed:
- $7
million for major weapons or weapons-related defense equipment;
or
- $25
million for other weapons or weapons-related defense equipment;
- An
indication of which sales or licenses are most likely to be approved
during the current year;
- An
estimate of the total amount of FMS sales and DCS licenses expected
to be made to each foreign country; and
- Other
information about the status and rationale of FMS and DCS
sales.
Though
not classified, the Javits report has never been released to the
public.
As
part of a report submitted in accordance with section 655 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, or the "FAA"),
as amended, each February the President must list the dollar value
and quantity of defense articles furnished under FMS in the previous
fiscal year.
Section
36(a) of the AECA requires the President to submit a quarterly unclassified
report to Congress:
- Listing
all LOAs for major defense equipment exceeding $1 million;
- Listing
all LOAs accepted during the current fiscal year, together with
the total value of all sales to each country that year;
- Including
projections of dollar amounts of expected FMS for the rest of
the quarter and the rest of the year; and
- Providing
other information about the status
of FMS and DCS sales.
|
FMS
by country:
2004-2007
(Thousands
of U.S. dollars)
| Country |
|
2004 |
|
2005 |
|
2006,
estimate |
|
2007,
estimate |
|
|
|
|
|
| Antigua
and Barbuda |
1,735
|
0
|
474
|
490
|
| Argentina |
4,596
|
15,000
|
4,000
|
0
|
| The
Bahamas |
0
|
272
|
700
|
300
|
| Barbados |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Belize |
274
|
141,463
|
112,200
|
0
|
| Bolivia |
6,477
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Bolivia,
Int'l. Narcotics |
400
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Brazil |
1,604
|
287,411
|
193,577
|
148,696
|
| Chile |
393
|
17,365
|
0
|
0
|
| Colombia |
105,074
|
202,584
|
112,462
|
67,370
|
| Colombia,
Int'l. Narcotics |
2,402
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Costa
Rica |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Dominica |
0
|
473
|
194
|
190
|
| Dominican
Republic |
598
|
602
|
0
|
0
|
| Ecuador |
7,867
|
5,597
|
22,140
|
6,780
|
| Ecuador,
Int'l. Narcotics |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| El
Salvador |
4,105
|
7,648
|
28,000
|
15,000
|
| Grenada |
274
|
505
|
194
|
190
|
| Guatemala |
0
|
2,460
|
0
|
0
|
| Guyana |
0
|
456
|
250
|
125
|
| Haiti |
227
|
734
|
700
|
1,619
|
| Honduras |
699
|
1,916
|
1,500
|
1,345
|
| Jamaica |
7
|
1,289
|
2,057
|
550
|
| Mexico |
5,454
|
4,009
|
10,080
|
8,830
|
| Nicaragua |
822
|
309
|
0
|
0
|
| OAS
Hqs. |
132
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Panama |
205
|
1,815
|
2,800
|
2,000
|
| Paraguay |
21
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Peru |
31
|
778
|
0
|
0
|
| Peru,
Int'l Narcotics |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| St.
Kitts and Nevis |
444
|
225
|
194
|
190
|
| St.
Lucia |
349
|
161
|
194
|
190
|
| St.
Vincent and the Grenadines |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Suriname |
45
|
0
|
250
|
0
|
| Trinidad
& Tobago |
79
|
87
|
0
|
0
|
| Uruguay |
67
|
385
|
0
|
0
|
| Venezuela |
14,330
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Total |
158,711
|
693,544
|
492,366
|
253,965
|
2000-2003
(Thousands
of U.S. dollars)
| Country |
|
2000 |
|
2001 |
|
2002 |
|
2003 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Antigua
and Barbuda |
0
|
|
450
|
|
541
|
|
530
|
|
| Argentina |
10,756
|
|
9,413
|
|
3,497
|
|
3,612
|
|
| The
Bahamas |
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
619
|
|
| Barbados |
0
|
0
|
35
|
|
116
|
|
97
|
|
| Belize |
77
|
|
186
|
|
0
|
|
404
|
|
| Bolivia |
8
|
|
997
|
|
652
|
|
210
|
|
| Bolivia,
Int'l. Narcotics |
1,140
|
|
1,259
|
|
824
|
|
1,462
|
|
| Brazil |
54,664
|
|
8,794
|
|
36,073
|
|
14,802
|
|
| Chile |
2,439
|
|
2,608
|
|
548,071
|
|
627
|
|
| Colombia |
257,902
|
|
16,588
|
|
37,203
|
|
25,545
|
|
| Colombia,
Int'l. Narcotics |
5,582
|
|
2,311
|
|
2,269
|
|
340
|
|
| Costa
Rica |
less
than 1
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
| Dominica |
87
|
|
120
|
|
210
|
|
228
|
|
| Dominican
Republic |
184
|
|
515
|
|
825
|
|
23,282
|
|
| Ecuador |
0
|
|
360
|
|
6,029
|
|
23,555
|
|
| Ecuador,
Int'l. Narcotics |
265
|
|
135
|
|
300
|
|
0
|
|
| El
Salvador |
2,599
|
|
1,643
|
|
3,056
|
|
2,225
|
|
| Grenada |
3
|
|
145
|
|
197
|
|
210
|
|
| Guatemala |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
| Guyana |
189
|
|
415
|
|
297
|
|
232
|
|
| Haiti |
300
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
| Honduras |
339
|
|
754
|
|
794
|
|
0
|
|
| Jamaica |
742
|
|
499
|
|
807
|
|
0
|
|
| Mexico |
400
|
|
21,421
|
|
2,057
|
|
6,805
|
|
| Nicaragua |
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
384
|
|
| OAS
Hqs. |
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
| Panama |
385
|
|
155
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
| Paraguay |
19
|
|
26
|
|
597
|
|
0
|
|
| Peru |
127
|
|
3,125
|
|
0
|
|
50
|
|
| Peru,
Int'l Narcotics |
454
|
|
392
|
|
179
|
|
172
|
|
| St.
Kitts and Nevis |
70
|
|
105
|
|
208
|
|
182
|
|
| St.
Lucia |
130
|
|
145
|
|
200
|
|
216
|
|
| St.
Vincent and the Grenadines |
130
|
|
105
|
|
113
|
|
110
|
|
| Suriname |
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
| Trinidad
& Tobago |
191
|
|
244
|
|
100
|
|
314
|
|
| Uruguay |
965
|
|
3,528
|
|
369
|
|
632
|
|
| Venezuela |
15,780
|
|
35,624
|
|
3,239
|
|
6,983
|
|
| Total |
355,927
|
136,909
|
112,097
|
357,771
|
611,620
|
117,069
|
113,828
|
83,620
|
1996-1999
(Thousands
of U.S. dollars)
|