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updated: 9/25/06 |
| Guatemala
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| Military and Police Aid | Economic and Social Aid | Sales | Training Institutions | Training Deployments | Overview
**All numbers in millions of U.S. dollars.
**All numbers in millions of U.S. dollars.
**All numbers in millions of U.S. dollars.
Because of the Guatemalan military’s history of corruption and human rights violations, the U.S.-Guatemala security relationship is not very deep or well-developed. The Guatemalan military has been banned from receiving certain types of military assistance since 1990, when Guatemalan soldiers murdered a U.S. citizen. Security assistance, mainly in the form of counter-drug aid, has gone primarily to the police, which have also faced serious problems of corruption and abuse. However, the U.S. military is interested in increasing assistance to the Guatemalan military in order to enhance its capacity to combat drug trafficking. Guatemala is a significant transit country for cocaine from South America to Mexico and onward to the United States. Security relationship According to the 2004 Foreign Military Training Report, the U.S.-Guatemala relationship “has been strained by several factors: continuing impunity in cases involving military participation in human rights abuses that occurred during Guatemala's 36-year civil conflict; a recent resurgence of abuses believed to be orchestrated by ex-military and current military officials; and allegations of corruption and narcotics trafficking by ex-military officers.”[1] Since 1990 the U.S. Congress has prohibited Guatemala from receiving assistance through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. However, money appropriated before 1990, under the now-defunct Military Assistance Program, remains frozen “in the pipeline” — meaning that it was appropriated by Congress, but remains unspent due to the restrictions. Over time the funds were rolled into the FMF program and they are now being held in a trust fund administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the total amount of aid currently in the pipeline for Guatemala is $3.23 million.[2] Non-binding report language accompanying the House of Representatives’ version of the 1999 Foreign Operations bill recommended that this money be used for programs to implement the 1996 peace accords and to build democracy.[3] However, this does not appear to have taken place. Foreign operations legislation since 1996 has banned funding for “regular” International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. Guatemala is restricted to “Expanded IMET” (E-IMET) funding, which pays for non-combat courses such as defense resource management and civil-military relations. President Oscar Berger, who took office in 2004, has begun instituting some military reforms. He reduced the Armed Forces by half and capped its budget at 0.33 percent of GDP. He is also seeking a lifting of the IMET and FMF restrictions. U.S. officials, wanting to reward Berger for these initial steps and to provide incentives for further military reforms, are exploring how they can use the frozen FMF funds to modernize the Guatemalan Armed Forces. U.S. Southern Command and the Guatemalan military have developed a $3.23 million plan for “enhancing Guatemalan military capabilities in the areas of counter-drug, counter-terrorism, disaster response, and peacekeeping operations with the bulk of funding going to the Air Force and Navy.”[4] According to Southcom, the U.S. President has the authority to make the frozen funds available, but “as a matter of policy…the Executive branch (Departments of State and Defense) will consult with the Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and National Defense Committees of Congress before making a decision whether to release or not.”[5] To that end, Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo Stein visited Washington in July 2004 to lobby U.S. officials to release frozen funds and to lift the existing bans on FMF and IMET assistance. However, at the time of this writing, the FMF and IMET bans remain in place due to the unaddressed history of massive human rights violations committed by the Guatemalan military and of continued involvement of Guatemalan military officers in human rights violations and organized crime. Furthermore, the Guatemalan government has yet to comply with the most significant aspects of military reform stipulated in the 1996 peace accords, which include: 1) the adoption of a new military doctrine that promotes respect for human rights and restricts the role of the Armed Forces to external defense; 2) drastic revision of the Guatemalan Army’s training curricula, especially those related to counterinsurgency; and 3) the removal from educational functions of military personnel involved in present or past human rights violations. A serious obstacle to improving the military’s record is the continued existence of illegal armed groups (also known as clandestine groups), a secretive and amorphous network of individuals who oversee and profit from drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. They are also believed to be responsible for threats and violent attacks against human rights defenders, justice officials, journalists and others. Efforts have been underway for the past few years to establish a mechanism to combat the illegal armed groups, including an agreement between the Guatemalan government and the United Nations to establish an international commission to investigate them. At the time of this writing, the commission’s establishment seems unlikely to take place, although other mechanisms for combating this problem are being pursued. The Guatemalan military has been receptive to counter-drug cooperation with the United States. According to the State Department, “Guatemala actively participated in the Central Skies combined counternarcotics campaign plan that included DEA and the U.S. Army. Guatemala has also been very cooperative in allowing the U.S. permission to enter their airspace and territorial waters in connection with counternarcotics missions.”[6] According to the State Department, Guatemala “scored some notable [counter-drug] successes during 2003. There has been a marked improvement in the ability of the GOG to react to incoming suspect aircraft, due to close cooperation between the USG and the Guatemalan Air Force (GAF). The GAF provides, when it can, air assets for interdiction missions and airlift for police and prosecutors conducting drug interdiction and eradication operations.”[7] The Guatemalan military has also participated in joint “Maya Jaguar” counter-narcotics exercises. Furthermore, in 2003 the U.S. and Guatemalan governments signed an agreement concerning air and maritime counter-drug cooperation, which was later ratified by the Guatemalan Congress. The agreement involves the Guatemalan Air Force, Navy, and National Civilian Police, and the U.S. Coast Guard.[8] The U.S. military works with the Guatemalan military on non-drug related issues as well, including disaster response, humanitarian and civic assistance, demining, and peacekeeping. The Guatemalan military has participated in a number of humanitarian and disaster relief exercises with the U.S. military. For example, 350 U.S. military personnel participated with the Guatemalan military in a New Horizons exercise to build schools, medical clinics, and water wells in March 2004. According to U.S. Ambassador John Hamilton, “New Horizons offers a field class in how militaries can be an integral part of a civil and democratic society” and praised Guatemala for embarking on “the process of reassessing its size – and role – of its military.”[9] Southcom is also involved in “regional operations to strengthen capabilities and foster cooperation within nations of the region [by] working more closely with the Organization of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) to promote military integration and cooperation in maintaining regional security.”[10] Another issue that is increasingly mentioned in U.S. officials’ discussions about security threats emanating from Guatemala are criminal gangs. According to General Hill, “Unemployment and poverty, together with a demographic surge in the younger population and thousands of leftover weapons from the wars of the 1980s, make Central America a fruitful recruiting ground for organized criminals. … There are estimated to be at least 25,000 gang members in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, the three countries where the problem is worst.”[11] He describes this threat as “difficult and complex because it falls precisely on a seam between law enforcement and military operations” and recommends that “Latin American leaders need to resolve this jurisdictional responsibility issue to promote cooperation among their police and military forces.”[12] Security Assistance Military Because of the bans on IMET and FMF assistance, very few Guatemalan military personnel have received U.S. military training. What little training has occurred has mostly been funded by “Expanded IMET” (or E-IMET), which does not pay for combat or technical courses, but instructs foreign soldiers in civil-military relations, rule of law and discipline in military operations, democratic sustainment, and other topics intended to “reinforce the goal of civilian control of the military and human rights principles.”[13] “Other training activities help Guatemalan forces strengthen their drug enforcement capabilities, conduct interdiction and eradication activities and improve their ability to integrate their planning and execution with U.S. entities in regional counter-narcotic, disaster relief or humanitarian operations.”[14] In 2003, 83 Guatemalan military personnel received U.S. military training through the E-IMET program, down from 190 during the previous year. The U.S. government also funds a handful of Guatemalan attendees at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies every year. Southcom and the Guatemalan Defense Ministry have developed a proposal for using the frozen FMF funding that will enhance “Guatemalan military capabilities in the areas of counterdrug, counter-terrorism, disaster response, and peacekeeping operations with the bulk of funding going to the Air Force and Navy.”[15] The proposal’s stated goals are to “support President Berger’s reform plan,” “support U.S. regional security objectives,” and “leverage U.S. ability to keep Guatemalan army on [the] reform path.”[16] The proposal consists of:
Police: Most security assistance to Guatemala has gone to enhance the counter-drug capabilities of the National Civilian Police (PNC). During the past several years, the International Narcotics Control (INC) account has provided between $2.5 and $3.5 million per year to support the Guatemalan government’s anti-narcotics efforts. Generally about half or more of that assistance goes towards “Narcotics Law Enforcement,” which is divided into three categories: narcotics interdiction; drug crop eradication; and institutional development.[17] In 2001, 95 Guatemalan counter-drug police participated in two light infantry training courses with the 20th U.S. Special Forces Group, funded through the “Section 1004” account. The FMTR had listed Guatemalan soldiers as recipients of this training that year, which, although technically not prohibited, appeared to be an attempt to skirt the ban on IMET and FMF. However, Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich clarified that this was an error: “The United States has not resumed military training of the Guatemalan Army. … Embassy Guatemala Military Group records confirm that the two courses … were provided to police officers who, after Embassy name checks, were cleared to receive counter-drug training. The training consisted of leadership and small-unit operational planning, land navigation, communications, medical, and tactics.”[18] In 1998, the U.S. government helped form, train, and equip an elite anti-drug unit within the PNC known as the Department of Anti-Narcotics Operations (DOAN). The DOAN received “operational funding, and technical and logistical support for infrastructure projects.”[19] According to the 2001 INCSR, the DOAN “receives significant training and support from the USG, [and was] considered to be one of the best-trained and armed units in the National Civilian Police (PNC).”[20] In April 2002, hundreds of DOAN agents were fired after eight officers were arrested for stealing more than a ton of confiscated cocaine. In October 2002, “Corruption forced the dissolution of the Department of Anti-Narcotics Operations (DOAN), which was plagued by scandals ranging from extra-judicial killings in Chocon, to the theft of 200% more drugs than were officially seized by police.”[21] After the DOAN was disbanded, the U.S. government helped create a new counter-drug unit within the PNC, called the SAIA. U.S. officials view the creation of the SAIA with optimism: “Despite the rampant corruption and dismal performance of the GOG [Government of Guatemala] in 2002, the INL program moved forward. After the dissolution of the DOAN, INL provided extensive training to the 400 new SAIA agents at the Regional Counternarcotics Training Center … on investigations, small unit tactics, information analysis and human rights. In addition, the program provided the necessary equipment for both the SAIA and the Narcotics Prosecutors to successfully perform their duties.”[22] Members of the Guatemalan police have also participated in “Maya Jaguar” counternarcotics training exercises with the U.S. Army and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).[23] Following the DOAN scandal, in early 2003 Guatemala was de-certified as a cooperative partner in U.S. counter-drug efforts (but was given a national interest waiver to keep U.S. assistance flowing). Guatemala was subsequently re-certified as a counter-drug ally in September 2003. According to the Congressional Budget Justification for 2004, $1.65 million in INC aid was allocated for:
The INCSR reports that INL will assume responsibility for the Department of Justice International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) in Guatemala, which provides training and assistance for law enforcement not specifically related to narcotics trafficking. In February 2004, 24 PNC agents received counter-terror training in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, funded through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.[25] ATA provides weapons, equipment, services and training designed to help foreign governments prevent and deal with terrorist acts, such as bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, hostage-taking, or hijackings. This marked the first time PNC officers received ATA training. Sources
[1] United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004: A Report to Congress (FMTR 2004) (Washington: June 2004) http://state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2004/ [2] U.S. Military Group-Guatemala, “Information Paper: U.S. Military Assistance to Guatemala,” July 1, 2004. [3] House of Representatives, House Appropriations Committee Report 105-719 on the FY 1999 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4569), September 15, 1998. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/z?cp105:hr719:[4] U.S. Southern Command, “Proposed Utilization of Frozen MAP Funds for GT Armed Forces,” not dated. [5] U.S. Military Group-Guatemala, “Information Paper: U.S. Military Assistance to Guatemala,” July 1, 2004. [6] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2003, “Canada, Mexico and Central America” (Washington, D.C.: Mar 2004). http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29833.htm [7] INCSR 2003. [8] U.S. and Guatemalan governments, Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Guatemala Concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sustances by Sea and Air, 19 June 2003. http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/wwwhambspe200316.html [9] U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, “Remarks by Ambassador John R. Hamilton during Inauguration of ‘New Horizons,’” 27 March 2004, http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/wwwhpbs200407.html [10] Hill 2003. [11] United States Southern Command, General James T. Hill, Commander, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, March 24, 2004. [12] Ibid. [13] United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004: A Report to Congress (FMTR 2004) (Washington: June 2004) http://state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2004/ [14] Ibid. [15] U.S. Military Group-Guatemala, “Information Paper: U.S. Military Assistance to Guatemala,” July 1, 2004. [16] U.S. Southern Command, “Proposed Utilization of Frozen MAP Funds for GT Armed Forces,” not dated. [17] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2004 (CBJ 2004) (Washington, DC: June 2003). http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/fy2004/21882.htm [18] Otto J. Reich, Letter to Lisa Haugaard, Director, Latin America Working Group, 13 August 2002. [19] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 1998, “Canada, Mexico and Central America” (Washington, D.C.: February 1999). http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/camex98_part2.html [20] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2001, “Canada, Mexico and Central America” (Washington, D.C.: Mar 2002). http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/8478.htm [21] CBJ 2004. [22] Ibid. [23] U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, “Inicia en Guatemala Programa Jaguar Maya de Combate al Narcotráfico,” 3 September 2003, http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/wwwhpbs200323.html [24] CBJ 2004. [25] U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, “Policía Guatemalteca Recibe Entrenamiento Antiterrorista,” 13 February 2004, http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/wwwhpbs200406.html International
Narcotics Control 1996: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Congressional Presentation
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