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last
updated: 9/25/06 |
| Mexico
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**All numbers in millions of U.S. dollars.
**All numbers in millions of U.S. dollars.
**All numbers in millions of U.S. dollars.
Since President Vicente Fox took office in December 2000, U.S. officials have expressed increased trust in and cooperation with Mexican security forces, particularly the Mexican attorney general’s office and the navy. The U.S. military’s relationship with the Mexican army has not improved as dramatically, despite a significant program during the late 1990s to train and equip Mexican soldiers to fight the drug war. Although the U.S.-Mexico security relationship has been dominated by counter-drug issues for the past decade, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the focus has shifted to include counter-terrorism and border security as well. US-Mexico Security Relations Whereas security assistance was once carried out almost entirely with counter-drug concerns in mind, security training and assistance programs are increasingly being recast in the light of counter-terrorism. The Foreign Military Training Report (FMTR) articulated this shift for the first time in 2003,[1] and more clearly the following year, when it stated that “The U.S. conducts extensive training in the counternarcotics and counterterrorism areas, with special emphasis on helicopter repair and maintenance of aircraft. Technical assistance covering a broad range of counterdrug and counterterrorism capabilities and assets enhance[s] Mexico's ability to combat both home grown and foreign narcotics traffickers as well as cooperate more effectively with U.S. counterdrug and counter terrorism efforts. Interdiction training is key to helping combat illicit activities and potential terrorist threats.”[2] The U.S. government reports having achieved “significantly improved levels of cooperation [with Mexico]… across a range of common interests and concerns, including counterterrorism, counternarcotics and the fight against corruption.”[3] The U.S. government’s main counter-drug and counter-terror partners are the Mexican military -- comprised of the Defense Ministry (army and air force) and the Navy Ministry -- and the Federal Attorney General’s Office (PGR), which includes the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI), akin to the FBI. Since President Vicente Fox took office in December 2000, cooperation and trust between the U.S. and Mexican security forces, particularly the PGR and the Navy, have reached “unprecedented levels.”[4] Security issues have taken a central place in the bilateral agenda. On a visit to Washington in May 2003, Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez asserted that “the number one priority in our relationship is the fight against terrorism.”[5] Military assistance to the Mexican army began in earnest in 1995, following Defense Secretary William Perry’s October 1995 visit to Mexico, the first-ever visit of a U.S. defense secretary to that country. (Prior to that, the Mexican military received only small amounts of International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance.) The U.S. government had long provided equipment and training to the PGR, but these assistance programs took on new life after Fox took office pledging to root out endemic corruption. The U.S. military has taken advantage of the common counterdrug mission to promote closer relations with the Mexican military, primarily through training. What had been described as a “virtually nonexistent” relationship prior to Perry’s visit now consists of more regular communication, training, and a bilateral military working group that includes counter-drug cooperation.[6] However, friction still exists in the military-to-military relationship, which “continues to be standoffish” according to one U.S. official.[7] The Mexican army’s historic distrust of its U.S. counterpart has proven difficult to overcome, despite having sent over 5000 soldiers to train in the United States since Perry’s visit. Mexico is also resistant to inclusion in U.S. Northern Command (Northcom), established by the Pentagon in 2002 to coordinate military activities relating to the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters. The Mexican military prefers to deal directly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as it has always done (Mexico had not been included in the “area of responsibility” of U.S. Southern Command, the regional command responsible for the rest of Latin America). Nevertheless, the Mexican military is involved in efforts to protect the U.S.-Mexico border from terrorist attacks. As part of Plan Centinela (Sentinel Plan), the army and navy deployed 18,000 troops to patrol the U.S.-Mexico border and to protect strategic installations. One Pentagon official expressed hope that the army’s willingness to cooperate in border security could be “a way to deepen the institutional relationship.”[8] The Mexican navy, on the other hand, is “totally different”[9] according to one Pentagon official, much more open and willing to engage with its U.S. counterparts. This attitude is reflected in the shift in U.S. training from the army in the late 1990s to the navy in more recent years, as well as efforts to improve naval cooperation through a “ship-to-ship communications plan” to “assist ships and aircraft of both countries to communicate better and respond more effectively to suspicious maritime vessels.”[10] According to the State Department, “Technical sub-groups also developed lists of suspect maritime vessels and prepared an analysis of drug trafficking flows and assets needed to enhance drug interdiction.”[11] Security Assistance As of 2004, U.S. security assistance for Mexico primarily involves technical capacity building and infrastructure support for the navy and the attorney general’s office, as well as enhanced border security equipment and training for Mexican customs and immigration officials – a far cry from the late 1990s, when the program revolved around training thousands of soldiers from elite army counter-drug units and equipping them with a fleet of helicopters.[12] Equipment transfers have dropped sharply since the failed helicopter package in the late 1990s. Military training has declined but continues to be substantial – from over 1000 soldiers a year in 1997 and 1998, training has ranged from a high of 857 in 2001 to a low of 520 in 2003. There is still a heavy emphasis on aviation, electronics, and communications courses, particularly for the Mexican navy and air force. Military Training The primary recipients of training are the Mexican air force and navy instead of the army. There continues to be a heavy emphasis on training that will aid in aerial and maritime interdiction efforts, reflecting drug trafficking patterns and the Mexican government’s chosen response. According to the 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), “Mexico's interdiction efforts focused on maritime and air drug movement on both coasts as traffickers responded with smaller load sizes,” and that “Continued technical assistance, training, and provision of equipment will help the Mexican Navy to interdict more drug shipments at sea. While cocaine arrives in Mexico by air, land, and sea, maritime smuggling remains the preferred mode of smuggling by drug traffickers.”[13] A review of training in fiscal year 2003 shows that the “Section 1004,” INC, and IMET accounts paid for the Mexican military to receive training in a variety of subjects, including: maintaining and operating aircraft and helicopters; engineering and electronics; radar systems; radio communications; computers; and English. A handful of courses in intelligence, counter-drug operations, and “ground defense skills” were given to the army. The most popular IMET courses were “leadership program” (75 navy students), “rule of law and discipline in military operations” (30 students), “Search and Rescue” (22 navy students), “Specialized English Language Instruction (23 students). IMET also paid for “Special Forces Qualification” for a few students from army special forces and amphibious groups. There were three group classes for Navy personnel dealing with outboard motor maintenance, boiler inspection, and drug interdiction techniques such as boarding exercises, hidden compartment and smuggling detection exercises, crime scene management, and arrest procedures.[14] (All of these courses are representative of the kind of training received by the Mexican military in the last several years.) The year 2003 marked the first time in nearly a decade that the majority of training was not paid for by accounts restricted for counter-drug purposes (“Section 1004” and INC). That year, only 43 percent of the training came from those counter-drug accounts, with IMET assistance accounting for another 41 percent. Even though the IMET account is not restricted to counter-drug purposes, there is a heavy drug emphasis, although these skills are also applicable in the counter-terror context.[15] The 2004 FMTR explained: “IMET-funded training in the areas of rule of law and discipline in military operations support the Fox Administration’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights in both law enforcement and military branches of government. Resource management and equipment repairs provide the necessary tools for the Mexican armed forces to be partners with the U.S. in … counternarcotics activities. The U.S. conducts extensive training in the counternarcotics and counterterrorism areas, with special emphasis on helicopter repair and maintenance of aircraft. Technical assistance covering a broad range of counterdrug and counterterrorism capabilities and assets enhance Mexico's ability to combat both home grown and foreign narcotics traffickers as well as cooperate more effectively with U.S. counterdrug and counter terrorism efforts.”[16] Because of Mexico’s historic concerns about sovereignty and distrust of the U.S. military, almost all U.S. training for Mexico takes place on U.S. soil. However, some U.S. training of Mexican naval personnel has taken place inside Mexico, mostly through Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). While no MTTs taking place in Mexico are documented in the 2004 FMTR, according to the State Department, early in the Fox administration the Mexican military “aggressively sought out training and assistance to improve its counterdrug capabilities, [and] the Mexican military services … have shown greater interest in use of U.S. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to provide training for large groups at lower costs.”[17] In 2002 there were five MTTs with the Mexican Navy providing instruction in interdiction planning (Veracruz), outboard motor maintenance (Veracruz), small boat operations (Chiapas), and advanced boarding procedures (Veracruz and Chiapas). There were four MTTs with the Navy in 2001. Police Assistance The United States also supports a variety of counterdrug programs for the Mexican attorney general’s office (PGR), technically Mexico’s lead counter-drug agency. Over the past two decades, the focus of this assistance has largely been to build up the PGR’s helicopter fleet for aerial crop eradication and interdiction efforts, to train thousands of police and prosecutors, to enhance the PGR’s intelligence capabilities, to improve money laundering controls and investigations, and to provide equipment, computers, and infrastructure. U.S. officials are enthusiastic about future progress, noting that “Many opportunities exist to enhance further the unprecedented level of cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement.”[18] Chief recipients of INC aid are the AFI and the PGR’s special anti-drug, intelligence, and organized crime units. In 2003, the US government sponsored “over 140 training courses for 6,484 Mexican police officers, prosecutors, and investigators at the federal, state, and local levels. Courses include a broad spectrum of skills, including crisis management, ethics, corruption investigations, supervision and management, basic investigative techniques, crime scene investigations, land interdiction, money laundering investigations, counterterrorism, collection and analysis of intelligence, and handling of cyber-crimes.”[19] The State Department’s support for the PGR’s airwing consists of maintaining 25 leased helicopters and 39 donated aircraft.[20] According to the 2004 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), the US government planned to help the PGR modernize its air fleet – “to the extent allowed by scarce resources” -- through “engine upgrades, repairs, and specialized training, including use of night vision goggles, engine repair, and pilot instructor training.”[21] In the future, drug-related security assistance is likely to support efforts to “improve Mexico’s end-game ability to respond to suspect aircraft landing at remote locations” through upgrade or replacement of helicopters that would allow Mexico to “conduct patrols, transport quick response teams, and coordinate police responses.”[22] Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States and Mexico signed the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership (known as the Smart Borders agreement) and the U.S. government began providing assistance to enhance border and port security, through X-ray and other inspection equipment, computer systems for information-sharing, and training for Mexican customs and immigration officials. This Northern Border Security Infrastructure program, funded through INC, began with $25 million appropriated in the FY2002 supplemental spending bill (P.L. 107-206), and received another major boost of $20 million in FY2004.[23] Sources
[1] Common security interests are “counterterrorism, counternarcotics and the fight against corruption.” United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003: A Report to Congress (Washington: June 2004) http://state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2003/ [2] United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004: A Report to Congress (Washington: June 2004) http://state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2004/ [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Remarks by Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez Bautista to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Re: US-Mexican Relations, Washington DC, Wednesday, May 7, 2003. http://www.sre.gob.mx/comunicados/giras/disc/d-01-05.htm [6] U.S. White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Report to Congress Volume I, “U.S.-Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation” (Washington, D.C., Sep 1997). [7] WOLA interview with Pentagon anti-drug official, Washington DC, 1 March 2004. [8] WOLA interview with Pentagon official, Washington DC, 1 April 2003. [9]WOLA interview with Pentagon official, Washington DC, 1 March 2004. [10]U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2003, “Canada, Mexico and Central America” (Washington, D.C.: Mar 2004). http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29833.htm [11] Ibid. [12] United States, Department of Defense, Brian E. Sheridan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Washington, April 27, 1999. [13] INCSR 2003. [14] FMTR 2004. [15] FMTR 2004. [16] FMTR 2004. [17] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2001, “Canada, Mexico and Central America” (Washington, D.C.: Mar 2002). [18] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2004 (CBJ 2004) (Washington, DC: June 2003). http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/fy2004/21882.htm [19] INCSR 2003. [20] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), End-Use Monitoring Report, (Washington, DC: December 2003). http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/eum/2002/27613.htm [21] CBJ 2004. [22] CBJ 2004. [23] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2004 (CBJ 2004) (Washington, DC: June 2003). http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/fy2004/21882.htm International
Narcotics Control 1996: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Congressional Presentation
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