Copyright
2000 Federal News Service, Inc.
Federal News Service
March 9, 2000
HEARING
OF THE HOUSE BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE
REP. JIM LEACH (R-IA): The committee will come to order. The committee
meets this morning to focus attention on money laundering and
the law enforcement regulatory challenges created by the proliferation
in recent years of so-called offshore secrecy havens. We are appreciative
that Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Eizenstat is here
to detail a legislative proposal announced last week by Secretary
Somers to combat the money laundering vulnerabilities associated
with some of these offshore centers, as well as to discuss the
administration's other anti money laundering initiatives.
Later today the ranking member and I will be introducing the administration-crafted
bill which builds in a constructive, although more limited basis,
on the provisions of legislation that I introduced last fall with
the co-sponsorship of Mr. LaFalce and 13 other members of this
committee. I look forward to working with the administration,
members of this committee, members of the other body and other
interested parties to pass meaningful anti money laundering legislation
this year.
Last September, when the committee met to consider issues relating
to the global money laundering threat, our focus was on allegations
of suspicious transfers of funds from Russia to accounts at one
of America's oldest and most venerated financial institutions,
the Bank of New York.
Before turning to the subject of today's hearing, I have several
comments on developments in that case. Last month, the Federal
Reserve and New York State Banking Department took supervisory
action against the Bank of New York requiring it to implement
new procedures for detecting suspicious activity. These were plainly
lacking during the three-year period in which some $7 billion
flowed through its accounts from dubious Russian sources. Also,
former bank executive, Lucy Edwards, and her husband, Peter Berlin,
entered guilty pleas in federal court to a variety of charges,
including conspiracy to commit money laundering and aiding and
abetting Russian banks and conducting unlawful and unlicensed
banking operations in the United States.
Shortly after the guilty pleas were entered, I notified the Department
of Justice of my intention to subpoena Ms. Edwards and Mr. Berlin
to compel their appearances before the committee. I did so because
of my belief that the Bank of New York matter raises fundamental
issues that demand Congressional review, including the extent
to which the U.S. financial system has contributed to the impoverishment
of the Russian people by processing transactions involving the
proceeds of crime and corruption in that country.
Also worthy of Congressional examination are the systemic implications
of Ms. Edwards and Mr. Berlin's acknowledged participation of
the scheme whereby Russian banks of questionable legitimacy and
with apparent ties to powerful Russian oligarchs operated illegally
in this country.
The specter of large-scale infiltration of our financial system
by corrupt enterprises abroad is not one that Congress can lightly
ignore. The Department of Justice, however, has expressed concerns
regarding the testimony of Ms. Edwards and Mr. Berlin before Congress
at this early stage of their cooperation with the government.
Consequently, I've indicated to the Justice Department that the
committee is willing to refrain, at this time, from issuing subpoenas
in deference to the law enforcement interest in conducting a thorough
debriefing of the couple. I've also made clear to the department
that the committee's patience in this regard has its limits and
that we expect the department to reciprocate the committee's recognition
of its legitimate institutional prerogatives by helping to make
Ms. Edwards and Mr. Berlin available for Congressional questioning
at the earliest possible date.
While the committee emphasis today will be on offshore secrecy
havens rather than the Russian crime and corruption issues that
were the focus of last fall's Bank of New York hearings, the two
subjects are, in fact, highly intertwined, as recent revelations
demonstrate.
For example, in testimony during last fall's hearings, it was
acknowledged that the then Russian president, Boris Yeltsin's,
son-in- law was the beneficial owner of two accounts at the bank's
Cayman Island's branch containing in excess of $2 million. Shortly
thereafter, the deputy chairman of the Russian Central Bank was
quoted in The Washington Post as estimating that in 1998 alone
$70 billion was transferred from Russian banks to accounts of
banks chartered in Nauru, a small island in the South Pacific
with a population of approximately 11,000 people.
Nauru's banking system, characterized by draconian secrecy laws
and minimal regulatory oversight, was described in the 1999 State
Department report as extending an open invitation to financial
crime and money laundering. Nauru also figures prominently in
the Bank of New York scandal. The criminal information to which
Ms. Edwards and Mr. Berlin pled guilty last month states that
several banks registered in various South Pacific islands, including
Nauru, were used as fronts to facilitate the illegal transfer
of money out of Russia into concealed Russian origin of money
flowing through the Bank of New York pipeline.
Offshore jurisdictions have also been at the center of allegations
of improprieties involving international monetary fund assistance
to Russia and other eastern European countries. Last year it was
discovered that the Russian central bank had secretly transferred
billions of dollars to Finley (sp) capitalized Shell Company located
in the Channel Islands. More recently, press reports indicated
that Ukraine Central Bank may have engaged in similar machinations.
The committee expects to examine these issues in greater detail
at its March 23 hearing on international financial architecture.
As noted before, money laundering is perhaps best understood as
a seemingly modest offense that opens a window onto greater crimes
that can have serious geopolitical ramifications. In the case
of Russia, the Bank of New York episode highlights the intractable
nature of corruption in that country and underscores the need
for U.S. foreign policy to align itself with the interests of
the beleaguered Russian people, not the Kremlin elites or the
commercial oligarchy.
Corruption is, of course, not exclusively a Russian phenomenon.
The recent historical record is replete with instances in which
foreign central banks and major money center banks have served
as vehicles for the misappropriation or outright looting of government
resources. Unfortunately, the U.S. banking system is hardly immune
from the dirty monies that flow all to freely through the global
economy.
For someone seeking to confer the appearance of legitimacy on
illicitly derived profits, the U.S. and other established financial
centers are attractive destinations. Indeed, there is little doubt
that funds representing illegal flight capital are the proceeds
of crime and corruption abroad enter the U.S. system in large
volumes on a daily basis.
What distinguished the U.S. from many other countries that criminals
or corrupt government officials use as conduits for the ill- gotten
gains, however, is our insistence on transparency and the rule
of law. When schemes such as the Bank of New York's circumstance
come to light, institutions and individuals can be expected to
be held accountable and legal mechanism ensure that the facts,
as awkward or inconvenient as they may turn out to be, are exposed
either to the criminal justice process or Congressional hearings
or both.
The same can most assuredly not be said for some of the offshore
havens that are the subject of today's hearings, where supervisory
controls are often lax or non-existent and where brass plate banks
and Shell corporations are permitted to operate free from any
meaningful judicial or regulatory oversight. The legal regimes
in many of these jurisdictions guarantee a label of secrecy or
for financial institutions licensed to do business with them that
far exceeds what is necessary to satisfy reasonable privacy interests
or legitimate commercial concerns.
Moreover, U.S. investigators who follow money trails to some of
these jurisdictions often run into dead ends, created by statutory
provisions, making it a criminal offense to release information
regarding clients, transactions, even a response to formal requests
from duly constituted law enforcement authorities.
Even where cooperation from the local authorities is ultimately
forthcoming, it is often only achieved after a period of delay
and foot dragging sufficient to permit the target of the investigation
to transfer the relevant assets and records to another secrecy
haven.
Recent years have witnessed some progress in introducing transparency
and openness in the offshore financial sector and some jurisdictions
previously notorious for offering safe haven to criminal proceeds
have executed mutual legal assistance treaties with the United
States authorizing the exchange of information and evidence in
criminal investigations.
A growing number of jurisdictions have enacted meaningful anti
money laundering statutes that conform to internationally recognized
standards. But even with laws on the books there remains a serious
question as to whether their exists either the political will
or the legal infrastructure to enforce those laws, particularly
given the sheer volume of activity being conducted offshore.
Further complicating the international money laundering effort
is the dynamic nature of the offshore market. No sooner does one
jurisdiction commit itself to meaningful countermeasures against
money laundering than another pops up in some other corner of
the globe to service the business flushed out of the first locale.
Indeed, in recent years, authorities in this country have noted
a migration of some savory operators from havens in the Caribbean
to remote islands in the South Pacific, such as the aforementioned
Nauru, that did not even register on their collective radar screen
five years ago. The ever-changing face of the offshore sector
presents enormous challenges for law enforcement officials and
regulators struggling to keep pace with international criminal
organizations.
This self-evident that an interdependent global economy with fewer
and fewer barriers to capital flows international money laundering
regime is only as strong as its weakest link. Accordingly, the
U.S. and its allies in the anti-money laundering fight must embrace
aggressive multilateral and bilateral strategies designed to encourage
jurisdictions that have been missing in action in this fight to
adopt the necessary legal reforms and dedicate the necessary resources
to supervising their financial sectors.
In this regard, I welcome the recent announcement by the financial
action task force formed 10 years by the G7 nations to coordinate
international anti-money laundering initiatives and hope that
it will produce later this year a list of so-called non- cooperative
countries and territories that offer financial services without
appropriate regulatory controls and subject to strict bank secrecy.
And I'm also hopeful that we get greater cooperation and cross
border investigation of financial crimes.
I'd like to turn to our ranking member, Mr. LaFalce.
REP. JOHN LAFALCE (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like unanimous
consent to put the entirety of my remarks in the record.
REP. LEACH: Without objection. So ordered.
REP. LAFALCE: Let me just make a few points. Last week, Secretary
Somers highlighted three very important reasons to embark on an
aggressive fight against money laundering.
First, it helps us pursue criminals who commit the underlying
organized crimes that generate tainted money, such as drug trafficking,
tax evasion, and fraud. It probably enables us to catch these
drug traffickers, tax evaders, fraud, better than any other mechanism.
Secondly, and this is very important too, it helps us fight the
foreign corruption that undermines the United States and multilateral
assistance programs to promote democracy and economic development
abroad. And that's extremely important, not just because the United
States programs can be effective, but because the efforts to bring
about democracies will or will not be successful dependent upon
how we can deal with the problem of corruption. And we need to
enhance our fight against money laundering in order to fight that
corruption, in order to help stabilize those countries; extremely
important.
And also, it helps us protect the stability of our international
financial system. And it's great to have the IMS with all the
debate going on about international economic architecture and
what they've done right and what they've done wrong and what they
ought to be doing in the future. But if the money that they do
lend -- short term, long term, project specific, whatever it might
be -- is going to be filtered in money laundering into corrupt
hands, it's going to jeopardize the stability of the whole system.
And so as we proceed legislatively we should keep these three
principles in mind.
Yesterday's unveiling of the 2000 national money laundering strategy
moves all of the stakeholders in this process-- the regulators,
the law enforcement officials, the financial service industry,
and the Congress in the right direction. Frequently we'll hear
from the financial services industry that it self regulates; it
self regulates well in the area of international and correspondent
banking and that, therefore, no legislation is needed.
There are too many examples, too egregious, where that just hasn't
worked, such as the recent one involving the laundering of Russian
organized crime funds through offshore centers and United States
financial institutions. We need a much better targeted, common
sense approach to fill the gaps in current law.
Now, last September, Chairman Leach and I introduced a bill, HR-
2896, and today he and I and others will be building upon that
effort, in large part introducing the bill developed by the Treasury
Department. And I think that it offers the kind of regulatory
flexibility that we need to tackle a fast-moving and remarkably
adaptable class of criminals.
In crafting the bill, the Treasury Department recognized the need
to provide a set of discretionary and targeted tools that could
be deployed to address discreet problems in recognized, money
laundering, offshore havens. For example, the secretary could
identify a particular institution in a foreign jurisdiction as
a primary money laundering concern. The entire foreign jurisdiction
would not necessarily be singled out as a -- well, it could be,
but the institution would be and the secretary would have the
authority to target the specific threat posed by that institution.
We will attempt to keep in mind the need to protect legitimate
commerce, that's essential, and to balance fairly burden sharing
between regulators and the industry. In partnership with the administration
and in partnership with the law enforcement community and the
regulators and the financial services industry, I think we can
enact this bill, perhaps with appropriate amendments and modification,
to accomplish our goals and protect the integrity of our international
financial system. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman,
and hearing from the administration.
Thank you very much.
REP. LEACH: Ms. Roukema.
REP. MARGE ROUKEMA (R-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
will keep my remarks brief. And certainly you, the chairman, and
the ranking member, Mr. LaFalce, have made the case very clear
here in your opening statements. I'd just like to add that money
laundering is not a victimless crime, the money does come from
drugs, illegal gambling, and a lot of other criminal activity.
And the crimes affect each one of us in our daily lives and law
enforcement has consistently told us that money laundering will
cut down on drugs and other crimes, and I believe them -- if we
take effective action.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to say, quite frankly, that I need --
and this is an upcoming issue, I mean a recurring issue -- that
I believe that we have to look at the issue of correspondent banks
more closely. The Bank of New York chairman, Tom Rainey (sp),
told this committee last year at hearings that the correspondent
banking opens the door to money laundering; I think that case
has been made. Once a bank, or an entity, has access to the international
payment system, the money is as good as laundered because the
money can be whisked around the globe with a touch of a button,
and I think that case was made.
I will be looking at this issue and other issues relating to banking
relationships and hopefully we'll be holding a hearing in my own
district, in New Jersey, in May. I had tentatively planned that
hearing even before yesterday 's announcement by the administration
-- and I believe we'll hear more from Secretary Eizenstat today
-- but that proposal for the hearing in New Jersey was made before
the high impact financial crime areas were identified. Sorry to
say, one of those high impact areas is the New York/New Jersey
area, which includes my district in New Jersey. And I certainly
know that Senator Schumer will be testifying on those related
subjects.
But I pledge with you, Mr. Chairman, that we must make progress
in specific ways this year, that is legislative progress, and
that's the reason I am an original co-sponsor of your legislation
and I want to move ahead in a bipartisan way. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. LEACH: Thank you very much, Ms. Roukema. Does anyone else
seek recognition for an opening statement? If not, let me turn
to deputy secretary Eizenstat, who this committee is very appreciative
of working with on a number of subjects, not the least of which
has been that he holds the administration's principle jurisdiction
on Holocaust issues. It's my view that Secretary Eizenstat is
one of the preeminent public servants of this last century. Is
that strong enough, Stuart? Please proceed.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: I appreciate that. Coming from you, it means a
lot. Mr. Chairman, Mr. LaFalce, members, I'm very happy to be
here this morning to present the international counter money laundering
act of 2000.
This committee has been at the center of a growing effort to expose
a serious problem of money laundering and to take effective steps
to combat it. There are a variety of measures that have been past
over the last several years which this committee has been at the
forefront of leading.
The legislation we're proposing today would fill a crucial gap
in our authorities and significantly enhance our ability to take
calibrated, targeted action with respect to money laundering threats
posed by foreign jurisdictions, institutions, or transactions.
Quite frankly, our legislative proposal has benefited considerably
from proposals that you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this
committee have made, from which we've liberally drawn. We look
forward to working with you and ranking member, LaFalce, with
the aim of enacting effective legislation this year and appreciate
very much the co- sponsorship that we have already from the chairman,
ranking member, and from other distinguished members of this committee.
I would like to point out that this legislation is being proposed
in the context of the national money laundering strategy for 2000,
which we unveiled yesterday. This comprehensive document reflects
considerable progress on a wide range of initiatives since our
initial strategy last year. It also announces a series of new
initiatives to combat money laundering in the area of financial
services, international policy, and federal, state, and local
law enforcement.
I would be most appreciative, Mr. Chairman, if the entire 2000
strategy document could be made part of this record.
REP. LEACH: Without objection, sir.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: The IMF has estimated that the amount of money
laundering worldwide is between two and five percent of the world's
total gross domestic product. By conservative estimates, that
would be close to $600 billion, and it is probably more. Regardless
of the exact figures, money laundering is a serious threat to
our country. First, because it facilitates drug trafficking, organized
crime, and international terrorism. Second, because it encourages
corruption in foreign governments undermining U.S. efforts to
promote democratic institutions and healthy economic development.
And, third, because it is a threat in and of itself because it
risks undermining the integrity of our financial system.
And, indeed, perhaps the most important revelation, I think, that
we've achieved in the last couple of years is the recognition
that it is just not an adjunct to other crime. It, in and of itself,
is a danger to the integrity of our whole financial system, both
domestically and internationally.
Safeguarding the integrity of the American financial system, and
protecting it from abuse, are fundamental commitments of this
administration, and we know of this committee. We concluded after
a lengthy study that specific legislative tools that the government
has available to protect our financial system from international
money laundering, or frankly to limit it. AT one end of the scale
we have advisories. At the other end, formal economic sanctions
under the international emergency economic powers act, or IEEPA,
and nothing in between.
Tax advisories can be effective. They can encourage financial
institutions to pay special attention to transactions involving
certain jurisdictions and to file suspicious activity reports.
But frankly they don't impose specific requirements, as an order
or a regulation would, and there's simply not a sufficient tool
to address the complexity and growing breadth of the international
monetary laundering threat.
At the other end of the scale are blocking orders under IEEPA,
which require a presidential finding of national security emergency
and operate to suspend all financial and trade relations with
the offending target. This is, in a sense, a sort of financial
atomic bomb. Such orders can affect legitimate, as well as illegitimate
commerce in the country. Therefore, it's not in and of itself
particularly well suited to deal with under-regulated foreign
financial jurisdictions. So what this bill seeks to do is to fill
in the gaps between only an advisory on the one hand and IEEPA
sanctions on the other.
Under our proposed legislation, if the U.S. government believes
that a certain foreign jurisdiction, a specific foreign financial
institution, or a particular type of international transaction,
poses a primary, money laundering threat to the United States,
we would be able to take a far wider range of actions. The secretary
of the Treasury, for example, after consultation with the secretary
of State, the attorney general, and the chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, could take one or more of the following types of
actions:
First, we could require banks or other financial institutions
to keep records of transactions and to make them available for
the government on a request. This would be invaluable to our law
enforcement and would help us better understand the specific money
laundering mechanisms that work. It could result, also, in pressure
on the offending foreign jurisdiction to improve their laws.
Second, another tool would require financial institutions, at
the discretion of the Secretary, if it was necessary, to ascertain
the foreign beneficial owners of accounts in the U.S. where they're
different from the owners of record. This would help dig through
layers of obfuscation and, often, plain deceit and would help
us know which foreigners are really holding money in the U.S.
banks.
Third, another tool would require identification of those who
are allowed to use a bank's correspondent accounts, as well as
its so called "payable through" accounts, which allow
customers of foreign bank to conduct banking operations through
a U.S. bank, just as if they were its own customers. Many of these
are, of course, completely lawful. But they can also be abused
by foreign money launderers who seek to clean their dirty money
through our financial institutions.
And, fourth, in extreme cases, the secretary, under the legislation
we propose, would have the authority to impose conditions or,
indeed, outright prohibit the opening or maintaining or correspondent
or payable through accounts.
It should be clear from this description that this is not a "know
your customer" bill. There is nothing in this bill, which
in any way requires banks to scrutinize or monitor the domestic
accounts of U.S. citizens. This bill only targets foreign jurisdictions,
foreign institutions, and international transactions that pose
a threat to the United States. I would note in this regard that
the U.S. banking industry has been generally supportive of our
approach and last week, for instance, the American banker's association
was publicly supportive of this legislative proposal.
Our proposed legislation, therefore, is designed to be graduated,
targeted, and discretionary. Graduated so that the Secretary can
narrowly target and tailor the action that would be proportional
to the threat. Targeted so that we can focus on the precise threat
we confront. And discretionary so that we can integrate these
tools into the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts we
're engaged in to persuade offending jurisdictions to change their
practices. To the extent to which we rely on multilateral action,
we think this will make what we do more effective, but we are
prepared to act unilaterally ourselves.
Permit me to briefly outline the process we intend to use to designate
foreign jurisdictions as money laundering threats. First, we would
gather data about other countries' laws, regulations, and practices
that either combat or facilitate money laundering. We would look
at experiences from U.S. law enforcement, and with this we would
then assess the scope and type of money laundering problems we
face from each jurisdictions. These assessments would be made
on an annual basis.
Second, we would seek to determine whether each of the problem
jurisdictions is primarily a source of criminal funds or primarily
a haven for dirty money. Political will would be relevant in both
cases, but the distinction is crucial in terms of the application
of specific counter measures. Source countries often face continuing
problems of political will and capacity in dealing with what are
at root domestic problems of crime and corruption. Havens tend
to be characterized by under-regulated, offshore financial services
and excessive bank secrecy.
Third, for each source country and money laundering haven, we
shall ask if it has an adequate anti-money laundering regime based
on the global, multilateral standards established by the financial
action task force on money laundering or FATF, a 26 country institution
created by the G7.
In addition, our analysis will all take into account the interplay
between tax evasion -- serious crime in its own right -- and money
laundering, since the same organizations and the same havens are
also and often used for both activities, often indeed by the same
criminals.
The answer to these questions would determine whether a jurisdiction
abroad, a foreign institution, or an international transaction
type is designed as a primary money laundering concern so that
the Secretary could then impose one of the new authorities. We
do actively participate in the work of international organizations.
In June, as you mentioned Mr. Chairman, the FATF is expected to
publish the names of jurisdictions that substantially failed to
meet its criteria for cooperation in resisting money laundering.
And we have submitted a number of such countries to FATF to consider.
The financial stability form, created by the G7 industrial countries,
is also reviewing the role of offshore financial centers and encouraging
them to put sound financial standards in force. And we 're also
working with the OECD countries to publish a list of tax havens,
which will also be available in the next several months.
We announced yesterday that the New York/northern New Jersey region,
the city of Los Angeles, and the city of San Juan had been designated
as high risk money laundering and financial primaries, and that
one money laundering system, the movement and often smuggling
of cash in bulk across the southwest border has received this
designation. We appreciation Congressman LaFalce's and Congresswoman
Velazquez's participation in that. In each, a money laundering
action team would be created and coordinate the efforts of federal,
state, and local enforcement. State and location authorities operating
within each, what we call, HCFA will also be eligible for grants
under the new financial crime, free community support program.
So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we have a multifaceted strategy.
But what we 're in front of this committee to discuss, primarily,
is our new act, which is focused on international money laundering.
There are those who believe that in the world of electronic commerce,
where funds travel so easily and so rapidly, that law enforcement
can't possibly keep up with criminals and corrupt officials, and
those who move their money for them. We strongly disagree. We
have the same information technology they have, we're more motivated
and dedicated than they are, and we will work to implement the
authority we have and the new laws we need and we will also seek
to work with other countries that realize that the threat of money
laundering is a difficulty for their own economic progress and
their own stabilities as societies.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
and I look forward to your comments and questions.
REP. LEACH: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We do have
a circumstance. There are two votes on the floor. And I think
rather than beginning and then stopping, it might be wiser to
recess for these two votes and then we will reconvene in about
20 minutes.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. LEACH: The committee's in recess. (Whereupon, the committee
recessed.)
REP. LEACH: Committee will reconvene. First I'd like to request
unanimous consent that all members be allowed to make opening
statements without objection if it's ordered.
Secondly, in terms of questioning, Mr. Secretary, the United States
has done more in recent years to seek these mutual legal assistance
treaties with other countries. Does it seem reasonable to you
to think of having a requirement or having as evidence of jurisdictional
problems countries that make these agreements with United States
before they can have reciprocal banking relationships within this
country? Is that a reasonable thing to point towards or not?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: I think it is a reasonable thing to point toward;
it's an important objective. Just as we try to have mutual tax
treaties, this would certainly give us the kind of cooperation
and additional tools that we would need. And so I think fighting
money laundering involves a whole range of things, of which that
certainly would be one useful adjunct.
REP. LEACH: There's a lot of concern in the--of two types of level
playing field. One relates between banks and other sectors of
the financial community within America. And the second relates
between American financial institutions and foreign. One of the
pluses of the less rigid approach of the administration 's bill,
as contrasted the one that we introduced earlier is that it's
a little more flexible and that this can perhaps have some advantages
in dealing with foreign countries in seeking comparable approaches
to doing things. Do you look on international negotiations in
this area as being a high priority of the administration, or is
this something that we just are always reacting about?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: No, it is a very high priority. We are working
through a number of different institutions. We're working with
the OACD to identify international tax savings. We're working
as one of the leaders of the FATF process. And in that FATF process,
which is a 26 country effort, there are 25 criteria that have
been identified by FATF as criteria by which they would judge,
along with us as a member, those foreign jurisdictions that are
lax in their oversight, that have excessive bank secrecy and that
are potential risks to the rest of the financial system.
And so that would give us the opportunity to target multilaterally
our efforts. So this is something we're very much involved with.
With respect to the issue you were describing of discretion, let
me indicate why the absence of discretion could actually complicate
rather than advance our goals. For one thing, it is important
to have the kind of discretion so that the response we make is
proportionate to the actual problem. Second, it is important that
a jurisdiction that is identified by, for example, the FATF process,
abroad or unilaterally by ourselves, be given the opportunity
to bring their own practices in line with internationally accepted
standards. If the first thing you do is hit them over the head
with the maximum sanction, you're not giving them the opportunity
to do so.
In addition, the automaticity that would come from the absence
of discretion, could actually complicate your ability to be tough
with countries because it would be less of a likelihood to name
a particular country if you knew that the only thing you could
do with it before graduated tools was the sort of maximum tool
of cutting them off and doing business in the United States.
We have every tool at our disposal and the legislation that you
and Mr. LaFalce have cosponsored. And we have every intention
of using it in the appropriate circumstance. So we think that
it is critical to have discretion. Discretion does not mean an
action. There is tremendous pressure from Congress, within our
own administration, across the board, all departments, and through
the FATF process to begin taking action. And I think in June when
FATF, for the first time, names actual countries, this will be
a real first in the fight against money laundering.
REP. LEACH: The driving concern that I have had is to upgrade
the significance of money laundering that's involved in public
corruption as it relates to public officials. And I just would
like to lay on the record, and as you take a discretionary approach,
can I be assured that the department is going to make this of
seminal significance to your efforts?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: You can absolutely be assured of that. But may
I add just one additional fact to my assurance? And that is that
we have a companion bill, which we worked with the Department
of Justice on, which has taken the lead -- which is also dealing
with money laundering. It was introduced on the last day of the
last session. And it would specifically amend our existing domestic
enforcement authorities, Mr. Chairman, so that we added foreign
corruption, corruption by foreign officials, as a predicate offense.
Currently-- this may be hard to believe but it is unfortunately
the case--if a foreign official, a Maputo (sp) or a Milosevic
or any such person were to take ill gotten goods stripped from
his country and put them in a U.S. financial institution we would
not be able to go after that as money laundering because it's
not now a predicate offense.
REP. LEACH: I appreciate that. The reason I raise it, this was
a provision in the bill that we'd introduced but was taken out
of the bill that you've come back with. And would you have objection
of our putting this back in?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: No, sir, quite the contrary.
SEC. STUART EIZENSTAT: Fine. Thank you. Mr. LaFalce.
REP. JOHN LAFALCE (D-NY): Thank you very much. Secretary Eizenstat,
as I look over the Congress, both in the House and the Senate,
and I'm trying to figure out how we're going to proceed, I'm concerned
with possible difficulties on both the left and the right; and
on the right the difficulties could be from either conservatives
or libertarians.
I think our primary difficulty might be, maybe I'm wrong, from
Libertarians who would see your proposals as something similar
to the "know your customer" rule or welling in nature.
The potential difficulties I see from the left is a possible distrust
of government, distrust that if you are given discretion that
you won't use it because of political reasons, you won't use it
because of personal reasons, you won't use it for whatever reason,
and therefore let's apply it across the board in a very automatic
pilot, rigid way. To a certain extent you've addressed, in your
response to the chairman's questions, that latter concern that
I envision from the left. Certainly, if you want to expand upon
that, please do so.
The one thing you didn't mention-- it's been my experience that
whenever you have mandatory provisions you inhibit the effectiveness
of law enforcement because you inhibit the ability to target the
resources. One example, right now we have a law on the books,
passed in 1996, part of the immigration law, that said if you're
going to cross the northern or southern border you must stop every
single individual and document them. Well, you would have a three
to four day wait and you wouldn't be able to target the individuals
that you really want to target. You divert your time, attention,
and resources, energies, et cetera. I would be concerned that
that might be the case if we just have this automatic pilot approach
without discretionary tools. I'd like you to comment on that.
But then I'd also like you to deal with what I anticipate as the
libertarian argument, "Let's get the government out of this,"
"know your customer" type stuff. "We had to stop
them once, we're going to have to stop them again." Would
you please comment?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Thank you very much, Mr. LaFalce. Let me respond
in the following ways. First, as I emphasized in my opening statement,
there is no fair interpretation of this proposed legislation which
would indicate that this is in any way, shape, or form a "know
your customer" bill. It does not require U.S. banks to monitor
or scrutinize domestic accounts of U.S. citizens; it targets foreign
jurisdictions, foreign institutions, and foreign international
transactions. And I think that, again, one validation of that
is the support or this approach that the U.S. banking industry
has shown. For persons, therefore, to be identified would be foreign
beneficial owners hiding behind false fronts and Americans who
own, or open accounts at domestic institutions would not be affected.
In addition, we are going through a separate process now in which
I think it 's clear we've learned the lessons from the difficulties
last year of the "know your customer" proposal. That's
been completely withdrawn. What we're looking at now, and then
only with the widest consultation, with both privacy groups and
banks and financial institutions is: first, that we don't intend
to issue any formal regulations; we're talking about guidance;
second, unlike the "know your customer" proposal last
year, which was regulatory rather than guidance, it also covered
virtually all accounts. The guidance we're looking at would only
require special scrutiny with respect to high-risk accounts. But
that's completely separate from the legislation itself. That's
something that's being done just domestically; it has no relevance
to this.
One additional point is on the privacy point. We recognize, obviously,
the need to protect individual privacy. And the Treasury Department
and FINSEN (sp) are very sensitive to that. We built very strong
systems to narrow the scope of the data that FINSEN receives to
protect its confidentiality. FINSEN has imposed a comprehensive
set of legal and technological restrictions to ensure the proper
use of the information. And the information, which is provided
to the government, can't be used for any purpose other than law
enforcement. We have our own working group on privacy in this
area. We a review, which is due in May, that will describe our
existing protections in the privacy area. And we expect, in November,
to have proposals for even stronger, improved, privacy protections.
On the on the hand, the points you make about automaticity is
that when you run anything on automatic pilot, you have the potential
for real problems. Even airplanes, when they're put on automatic
pilot, have a pilot who's got the ability to turn that off. We
want to make sure that we don't, unwittingly, by automaticity,
put foreign jurisdictions under such a target that they don't
have the opportunity to correct their lack of supervision, or
excessive secrecy; that we don't have a stepped set of tools to
encourage them to do so and that, in fact, the cause of the automaticity
there may be a reluctance to even name such a jurisdiction.
So, we very much appreciate the leadership that Senator Schumer
and others have provided in this area, we want to work very closely
with him and those who want legislation in this area, but we have
to make sure that it is proportionate to the particular problem.
And, again, discretion in no way here means inaction.
REP. LEACH: Ms. Roukema.
REP. ROUKEMA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to this
question that I alluded to in my opening statement on how the
Bank of New York at a prior hearing identified the correspondent
banking opening the door to money laundering.
And you have referenced -- it is my understanding, let me say
-- that the administration wants to give Treasury the authority
to declare which countries are off limits to U.S. banks and for
correspondents accounts.
Now, you made reference to it in your opening statement, I believe,
but can you give me a little more specificity about how that would
work? And do the U.S.
-- I'm sorry -- how can you describe what examination procedures
the U.S. federal banking agencies could or would follow and what
changes in legislation do we need in order to permit and implement
this approach so that we can close off this avenue for money laundering?
We need a little more specificity on that and I don't know whether
or not our legislation deals with it adequately.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: First let me say that Secretary Somers mentioned
himself in his March 2nd speech a number of jurisdictions, from
Russia to Nauru (sp) and others in between that are either sources
or havens. And to show our seriousness of purpose, Secretary Somers
has just sent a letter to the first deputy prime minister of Russia
in which we stressed the critical importance of them enacting
any money laundering legislation which comes up to FATF standards.
That's literally just been sent.
What we would do with respect to the particular provision you
mentioned is that correspondent accounts can be, in many instances,
perfectly legitimate. But it also serves as an avenue for abuse.
So what we want to be able to do is have the discretion when our
law enforcement authorities, FINSEN and others, believe that it
is necessary to be able to identify those who use a bank's correspondent
accounts and, if necessary, to cut those opportunities off in
terms of dealing with U.S. institutions. So, when necessary, we
need to be able to find out who really benefits in the accounts
and that the, we think, transparency of identifying beneficial
ownership can be very important in this instance.
REP. ROUKEMA: Well, will you help us with our own legislation
as to where that discretion has to be tightened up or more precisely
defined? Correct me if I'm wrong, but I sense that there is not
precision in the law now --
SEC. EIZENSTAT: That is correct.
REP. ROUKEMA: -- that gives them the authority. So we need your
help in defining that statutorily.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Our legislation that we've sent up has a very
specific provision dealing with this, and I think it provides
precisely the kind of direction that you would be seeking.
REP. ROUKEMA: All right. Thank you. Let me just ask briefly, I
think you've gone into this, but, again, being from New Jersey--and,
by the way, Senator Schumer I'm sure will be addressing this--but
being from New Jersey I am deeply interested in what is the administration
recommending in terms of increased prosecutors and increased personnel
to deal with these high impact financial crime areas, aside from,
of course, what Senator Schumer's doing? What is the Treasury
recommending?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: First, we have for the first time a unified account
of $15 million in our budget to deal specifically with money laundering.
Second, we have an existing amount of $2.5 million for so-called
SEFA (sp) grants. And we 've asked in this budget for double that
amount. This would permit technical assistance, computer assistance,
analysis, training of local prosecutors to better sensitize them
to money laundering -- because oftentimes, unfortunately, money
laundering is just viewed as an incidental effect of narcotics
or organized crime when, in fact, as I stated, it is a problem
in and of itself.
The designation that we made yesterday of New York and northern
New Jersey as a HIFCA (sp) area means that we will be creating
a action team of federal, state, and local prosecutors who will
act in the same way that similar bodies work in the organized
crime area to maximize the cooperation of all prosecutors of all
of our intelligence capability. And so we think it will be a very
effective tool.
Now being a so-called HIFCA doesn't guarantee that you'll receive
one of these SEFA grants, but certainly it makes one a strong
candidate for it. So the combination of having an action team
and, where appropriate, having this kind of grant assistance for
training of local officials for computer assistance, for technical
assistance, we think will help the localities deal with this growing
problem.
REP. ROUKEMA: Thank you, that's all very positive and we certainly
look forward to working with you and lobbying you on giving us
the top priority. Thank you.
REP. LEACH: Thank you, Ms. Roukema. Ms. Waters.
REP. MAXINE WATERS (D-CA): Thank you very much. I'd like to thank
the (size) and staff for being here today and for the work that
has been done to address an area that many of us have been encouraging
the administration to get more involved in. There are so many
contradictions.
Before talking about the drug trafficking aspects of this, I have
been talking with you and your shop about corrupt money. And you
have defined that a little bit differently. But, again, I'd just
like to say publicly that it's an absolute contradiction for us
to talk about debt relief for many of these poor countries --
and that includes Africa and many in Central America -- when,
in fact, some of our own banks are holding more corrupt money
in the banks than we can give in debt relief.
And I do want very much for your shop, if that's your responsibility,
to get that money and get it back to those countries, particularly
Nigeria where we're trying to support democracy. And let us not
pretend as if we don't have the power to somehow do that. We've
got to work on that. That's one part of what I consider money
laundering, even though it may not be considered drug money laundering,
it is corrupt money that's been stolen from countries that need
to be returned to them so that we don't ask our American taxpayers
to continue to support a debt relief which we all believe in.
Secondly, Secretary Eizenstat, I don't see that part of our problem
is that we don't know who's laundering the drug money. And it's
not as if we have to have a lot more money placed into systems
to simply identify. I requested some time ago, and I'm looking
at a long list of banks and financial institutions that have been
identified for laundering drug money, and of course they just
get fined. And nobody gets put out of business.
We know who they are. Even as we move forward and -- one of these
sting operations that we had, Operation Casablanca, at the same
time that we were moving on banks in Mexico because of the laundering
of drug money, Citibank was purchasing CONFEA (sp) and CONFEA
was a notorious bank for laundering drug money. And at the time
that they were purchasing them I -- it's hard for me to believe
that a big bank like Citibank, or whatever, does not have enough
capability to do due diligence, that they wouldn't know that that's
a dope money laundering bank.
So I have a whole list of them. We show them doing business in
our country. We have fined them and guess what? Paying fines is
simply a cost of doing business as it relates to the laundering
of drug money in our country.
And while I'm interested in identifying so-called "high drug
intensity" areas, et cetera, I want us to start with hope.
I've been working for three years on Raoul Salinas' drug money:
$180 million deposited in Citibank. "Know your customer"
was not even thought about; there was not even a card on him to
identify where he lived. He was assigned a private banker.
I've been trying desperately to get us to talk about what we're
going to do about private banking and understanding how it works
in all of these banks and concentration accounts, where the identity
is lost once they pull that money. And, guess what, I also had
an amendment in the money laundering bill prevention act of 1999
that simply said that our banks would not be allowed to do business
with off shore banks and others that we know launder drug money.
We know they launder drug money in Antigua.
Part of the monies that were deposited in Citibank by Raoul Salinas
was sent to these concentration camps and off to the offshore
banks. Whether it's Cayman Islands or Antigua, we can just say
no. If you do business with them, then you 're a part of them.
And you shouldn't do business with them, and we're going to penalize
you for doing business.
Now, again, we can spend a lot of money and talk about how we
develop processes for doing-- what? We know how to identify them;
and, again, I've got this whole list here. I don't know if you've
seen this-- from 1997 to 1999 of just scores of banks that laundered
drug money that we penalized. And we do some forfeiture and we
do some civil penalties and all of that.
So I guess my question to you is this, are we prepared to get
tough and are we going to start at home or are there banks that
are too big to touch? Where is the case on Raoul Salinas and the
$180 million? And are we going to get in a period of time where
time is going to run out on that case for us to do something?
Are we prepared to get tough? Are we prepared to put anybody out
of business? And are we prepared to stop American banks from wire
transferring money off from these banks into offshore banks knowing
that they're just dealing with -- they're havens for the drug
traffickers.
And, let me just add, are we willing, given -- I have so many
Mexico banks here who are known for drug trafficking that we've
penalized because they do business in our country and they're
just paying money because it's the cost of doing business, but
this administration is going to fight for certification. What
are we talking about? Are we prepared to get tough?
And let me tell you why I'm so adamant and passionate about it.
Every day in inner cities of America, young men are going to prison
for having five grams of crack cocaine; mandatory five years in
federal prison -- mandatory. We've got undercover agents out there,
we've got people getting caught up in this, but guess what? If
they weren't able to launder that dope money that crack would
not be in these inner cities.
And I tell you, it is absolutely unconscionable and immoral for
us to keep talking about, we have a war on drugs and we're cleaning
it up, while we're throwing more and more into a prison system
that does nothing but warehouse them, does nothing for rehabilitation,
sets them up as the problem, and the problem is the big boys.
Who's willing to touch them? I'm really fed up. And it 's not
you, this is not a personal attack on you, it's not a personal
attack on anybody. But it is an identification of the contradictions
that exist in this country that allows this stuff to continue.
And the victims, who are getting caught up in this and overcrowding
the prisons and spending more and more money on the prisons, and
these big boys are getting away. Who's willing to take on Citibank?
I want to know.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: That has two parts. The first you started off
with was on foreign corruption. You and I have both been to Nigeria,
within a few months of each other, and indeed we discussed your
trip before you went.
Nigeria's a very good example of a country that was stripped bare
by corruption, an impoverished country that's the fifth largest
oil producer; you had to wait hours in line for gasoline at a
gas station. And there is, in the new administration of President
Oversonjo (sp) a real desire to attack corruption. There's a new
coalition for Africa with 11 countries that has proposed a new
set of guidelines to attack corruptions because they realized
that corruption is the enemy of development.
We are working with those countries to try to support that. But
beyond that, we have not only a focused study going on with what
we call "attacking kleptocracy," which is the use of
illegal funds by leaders but we're going further -- and this was
the response to the chairman's earlier question.
In separate legislation that we introduced last year and has been
reintroduced this year, we would like to add foreign official
corruption as a predicate crime because right now if, for example,
President Oversonjo's predecessor or Mr. Milosevic had taken corrupt
funds, funds that they stripped bare from their own country, and
put them in a U.S. financial institution, we could not go after
that under our money laundering laws because foreign official
corruption is not a predicate crime.
So we suggested adding foreign corruption, as well as arms trafficking
and other things that are not currently predicate crimes, so that
we can use our money laundering authorities to do that. And we
hope we will have support from the Congress to add a foreign official
corruption as a predicate crime.
Second, with respect to the concern you expressed about going
after domestic banks, obviously shutting off a bank, cutting its
license off is an extraordinarily consequential act to take because
of the impact it can have on innocent account holders. But I want
to assure Congresswoman Waters that we intend to be tough on money
laundering. We've charged a number of domestic financial institutions
with money laundering and related violations from the Bank of
New England to the First Bank of Georgia and many more.
Just on March the 7th, just a couple of days ago, the president
of a New York bank, the MTD Bank of New York, was indicted for
a money laundering scheme involving defrauding the government
of Argentina. We have a very real intention to make this a major
priority, we intend to be tough, and we think that the strategy
that we laid out yesterday, which has both this international
bill that we're discussing today as well as a variety of domestic
actions, is indicative of our willingness to be tough.
REP. WATERS: Mr. Chairman-- unanimous consent for one more minute.
REP. LEACH: Let me say to the gentle lady, while your time has
gone over, you 've raised some of the most important questions
for the committee. And please proceed.
REP. WATERS: Thank you very much. One, on the monies that are
stolen from governments such as Nigeria, what responsibility can
Treasury take without having laws that would, perhaps, get at
that to use just the power of that important office to say to
Citibank, "A bunch of boys stole the money, it's in your
bank. They're in prison because not only did they steal the money,
they murdered the wife of one of the leaders who had been elected
and thrown in jail. Just give the money back to Nigeria, let the
bunch of boys then try and get it back."
I mean, why can't we say to Citibank, "You ought to give
the money back." And that goes for other countries that they've
been taking the corrupt money for years from -- why can't we just
tell them to do that?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: This is a good question. You mentioned the Salinas
matter as well, which I know you've had a special interest in.
What we are now doing, and we announced this in our strategy yesterday,
is we're embarking on a very accelerated effort to reach out to
our financial institutions. And this will lead to guidance that
will be provided to them of how to identify high-risk accounts,
like the ones you mentioned.
It may be private banking accounts, it may be accounts over a
certain amount of money, or it may be accounts in which people
opened the accounts with large amounts of cash. So we're looking
at ways in which we can provide guidance to sensitize banks to
look at those precise types of accounts.
We hope very shortly, within the next couple of months, after
this outreach program, to be able to announce to you ways in which
that guidance would work and ways in which these activities could
be better looked at. And last, I want to assure you that the suspicious
activity reports; these require, require, this is mandatory, when
a bank, whether it's Citibank or Bank of New York or any bank
anywhere in the country, has any reason to believe that a particular
transaction or account is suspicious, they are required to file
with FINSEN, which is a part of the Treasury department, a report
of that transaction.
And I want to assure you that those SARs as we call it, Suspicious
Activity Reports, don't go on a shelf and just lie there. They
go to all our
enforcement-- the FBI gets it, Customs gets it, FINSEN gets it.
And I could list to you one case after another, organized crime,
a syndicate that was broken in Chicago, smuggling rings for cigarettes,
which these SARS have helped identify.
REP. WATERS: Well, the problem is just what you described, Secretary.
For example, at Citibank the most notorious are the most well
known, private banker perhaps in the world-- indicated that they
were not suspicious of Raoul Salinas because he was the brother
of the president.
And surely, just because he had $180 million in cash didn't mean
that there was anything wrong with that.
At the same time, we're watching the reports come out of Mexico
day in and day out about people being murdered on the streets;
they even threatened the drug czar when he was down there. And
they killed one of our DEA agents. And people are missing. And
it goes on and on and on, but they didn't have any reason to be
suspicious about this $180 million cash. So those reports are
only generated when you ware suspicious. Well, if they're not
suspicious and they don 't generate those reports then what are
you going to do?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Well, obviously, our first lines of defense against
money laundering are the financial institutions themselves. But
we hope, again, with this new guidance that we're going to propose,
that it will sensitize banks so that type of situation is viewed
from the start, from the start, as a suspicious activity. And
we share both your concern and your passion.
REP. LEACH: Thank you, Ms. Waters; and since the Treasury also
has accountability for the Secret Service, the chair would certainly
entertain having the Secret Service travel with you if you ever
go to Mexico.
REP. WATERS: I just left. You know I'm not scared of anybody.
REP. LEACH: Mr. Barr.
REP. BOB BARR (R-GA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In your remarks,
Mr. Eizenstat, on page 7 you say that, "This summer we hope
to issue our final rules for casinos and card clubs. We have also
been working with the FCC and we expect to publish proposed rules
covering SAR reporting by brokers and dealers and securities later
this year." To what extent do you anticipate those rules
regarding reporting by brokers and dealers will track the current
SAR rules and requirements regarding banks? Do you anticipate
that there will be differences?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Thank you, Congressman. I know this is an area
where you've been most interested and shown a lot of leadership,
which we have appreciated. We expect by the end of the year working
with the Securities and Exchange Commission to have rules out.
Because broker/dealers are in a different situation and because
we're still trying to assess whether or not these types of transactions
that brokers and dealers engage in are really subject to the same
abuses as other MSBs--money service businesses, or casinos--I
don't want to say to you that the SAR requirements would be identical.
We want to make sure we tailor it to the particular need.
The SEC has a great sensitivity as well to the industry that it
regulates, and we're cooperating with them. So it is certainly
something that is going to be a serious effort, it is a proposed
rule by that time, but I wouldn't want to say that it will simply
duplicate the others because we want it tailored to the particular
need and the particular concern of that industry.
REP. BARR: And to the extent that you can, will you be working
with this committee in developing those -
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Absolutely. We will be very transparent. And let
me just say that one of the reasons that at our roll out strategy,
for the strategy for 2000, Jim Sloan, who's the head of FINSEN,
announced our money service business rules, our MSB rules, with
more to come on casinos and later on brokers and dealers, is because
we want to try to create a level playing field as well for banks.
We don't want banks the only ones who are required to file SAR's.
It's not fair to them. It's important that they do so, but it's
not fair to them.
And second and equally important is that we would only be doing
a part of the job if we put the burden on them because the more
we crack down on those who are using our depository institutions
for money laundering, the more likely it is that money launderers
and criminals are going to use these other avenues, MSB's or casinos,
for their money laundering. So we want to make sure in that respect
to that we're closing loopholes that exist. And we will work very
closely with the committee-- and particularly with you because
I know of your interest.
REP. BARR: Thank you. Could you just take a couple of minutes
on a different matter? But just sort of think out loud and weigh
the policy pros and cons with regard to requiring foreign financial
institutions, particularly foreign banks, from being required
by U.S. law, if there were such a U.S. law, to make them subject
as a condition of doing business in this country to the identical
record keeping regulations and proposals that laws and regulations
the U.S. banks are subject to.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Well, that obviously is the goal. And may I say
that we're trying to do it in a variety of ways. First of all,
we're working through what is called the FATF process, Foreign
Action Task Force. This is 26 countries, a task force created
by the G7 countries a decade ago, and this has been an extremely
useful process. They have 40 recommendations of actions that should
be taken with respect to supervision, with avoiding excessive
bank secrecy, and countries are being asked to come up to those
standards.
We're working, for example, with Mexico, with Israel, with Russia
to try to come up to those standards. When I was in Israel just
a couple of months ago I met with Finance Minister Shokad (sp),
and I pointed out to him that Israel, for example, does not now
meet those FATF standards. They have legislation in the Knesset
to try to do so. So we're talking about countries across the board
that we want to bring up to these FATF standards.
Second, to show you that there's bite to this, Austria, which
is a member of FATF, has been told that if by June of this year
it doesn't begin the process of ending its refusal to identify
the names and owners of savings accounts that it will be expelled
from FATF.
Third, by June of this year we expect that FATF, having taken
referrals from ourselves and eight other countries of countries
we believe are potential money laundering havens, that they will
list those countries specifically, at least some of them. And
once that's done, and you have an international spotlight, that
will be very consequential.
And, last, once that process is completed and countries are listed
are listed through the FATF process, we would then be expected
to act on our own to back up that. And one of the reasons that
we want this graduated and targeted set of tools in our bill is
so that when that list comes out we have a variety of tools that
we can target to the particular country. You couldn't just use
one set of tools for all of them and say, well, we're just going
to cut you off completely. But we want a graduated set of tools,
including the ones that you asked about.
REP. BARR: But then what are you saying then is, you're agreeing
with me then, as a general policy matter there should be no problem
with making foreign banks, as a condition of doing business in
the United States, being subject to the same laws and regulations
that U.S. financial institutions are subject to with regard to
information that they're required to obtain from depositors and
customers in the retention of those records?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: In general, again what we would like to do is
bring all countries up to the FATF standards, which include that
measure of disclosure and supervision.
REP. BARR: Thank you.
REP. LEACH: Thank you. Ms. Maloney.
REP. CAROLYN B. MALONEY (D-NY): And thank you, Mr. Eizenstat,
for appearing before the committee and for your continued work
in this area and in another very important area, the holocaust
asset issue.
As communications tools transform financial services, the United
States and this committee must continue to update money-laundering
laws to contend with these obvious new threats. In the long term,
the ability to transfer capital globally over the Internet or
other electronic system is a revolutionary development.
Resources can be increasingly shifted to more efficient uses across
the world, spurring competition and benefiting consumers. But
this system is also being used to anonymously move massive amounts
of money for corrupt purposes. The ability of launderers to hide
their criminal proceeds has a far-reaching effect beyond the financial
system.
Money laundering in Russia has greatly complicated international
financial institution lending and other aid. The laundering of
drug money from South America facilitates a system that undermines
democracy in the region and finances the flow of drugs to the
U.S., which my colleague, Ms. Waters, underlined. And recent laundering
cases at some of the most revered institutions in the U.S. should
be a warning enough. If large scale money laundering can occur
at institutions like the Bank of New York, other cases are likely
going undiscovered, and we are probably just seeing the tip of
the problem.
I believe the Treasury proposal, giving the Department discretionary
authority to ask institutions to collect detailed information
on customers from countries that are considered to be havens,
is a thoughtful step in the right direction. But I am a cosponsor
of the Leach/LaFalce bill that was introduced last year, and that
legislation went a step farther in requiring entities that open
U.S. accounts for foreign entities to identify all beneficial
owners of accounts.
Some critics of the Treasury proposal argue that discretionary
authority for the department to ask for information on customers
is simply not enough. They argue that because of the burden associated
with determining beneficial owners, regulators may be under great
pressure not to institute such burdens, and banks may decide not
to ask the information. So how do you address this?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Well, let me mention two aspects of your question.
The first is, when you talk about the Internet and the fact that
this provides opportunities for additional money laundering, I
was struck by Senator Schumer's very excellent point in his testimony
in which he mentions how easily his own search through the Internet
determined -- and he mentions a particular Internet site in which
-- Senator, if I may quote your excellent testimony -- in which
the site offers an offshore bank account in a particular Baltic
state and says that no country, especially not the EU or the U.S.
have the powers to request, of course, information from the authorities.
So the Internet is being used to entice people to, in effect,
hide ill-gotten goods. And our concern is particularly the use
of that then in U.S. financial institutions.
So this is a growing problem, it requires the kind of international
response as well as our own response that our legislation would
provide.
Second, with respect to the issue of discretion, again, I very
much respect Senator Schumer's legislation and what was, last
years, Congressman Leach and Congressman LaFalce bill. I'm very
pleased that this year they're endorsing our legislation. But
let me again go to the issue of discretion versus automaticity.
I would first note that the legislation that was introduced last
year only covers offshore accounts. Our legislation is, in that
sense, broader; it covers all banks, including, for example, Russia
or other countries and jurisdictions.
Second, all the tools that would be in the legislation introduced
last year, which you referred to, are tools that would be in our
tool kit if our legislation, now the new Leach/LaFalce bill, were
to be passed. And we have no disinclination to use those tools.
Third, it's important to be able to go up a chain of tools. If
you start with an atomic bomb, which is in effect saying no one
who has inadequate supervision can do any correspondent relationships
with the U.S, you don't give us the opportunity to use a variety
of diplomatic efforts and less restricted tools to change that
conduct.
And we ought to be given that opportunity before we take such
a dramatic step. And, indeed, the step is so dramatic that one
danger is that it may encourage other administrations to be unwilling
to even name a country because the consequences of naming are
so automatic and so egregious. This ought to be not the first
but one of the other opportunities if they show that they're not
willing to take action in response to our other tools.
I can assure you as well that there is a complete agreement in
this administration, including in the State Department as well
where I worked for two years, that this money laundering problem
is a detriment not just to the United States but to the country
itself which is either the source or the haven for
it-- that it is a destabilizing impact on those countries, that
it is a deterrent to their growth. So I don't think you'll find
any disinclination.
But we need the discretion to target in a proportionate way --
each country's not going to be in the same situation -- to target
in a proportionate way and raise their level up to that which
we think is necessary and adequate.
REP. LEACH: Mr. Secretary, if I could interrupt for a second and
ask if there could be some accommodation for a minute. We have
a vote on and we have about five minutes where we have to leave
for the vote.
But Ms. Velazquez, Senator Schumer has requested if he could come
now he could give his statement and then we could turn to you.
But that is your discretion. I think it's important in timing.
Senator Schumer has been delayed quite a bit here, and he has
another appointment. Would that be all right with the two of you?
REP. MALONEY: Mr. Chairman, if I could ask him to put in the records
to accommodate you. My second question is, how the Treasury proposal
would have applied to the Bank of New York case, and how would
the Treasury's new powers under the proposal have prevented the
laundering by the Berlins. If we could see an exact example --
I understand we don't have time now -- but if you could get that
back to the record in writing, if that's possible, to accommodate
the great senator from the great state of New York.
REP. WATERS: He's not here.
REP. MALONEY: He's not here.
REP. LEACH: We have a second request, which is that the senator
would ask if we could end with you and that he would then come
after you when we return.
REP. MALONEY: That's fair.
REP. LEACH: Let me turn to Ms. Velazquez.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: May I say, we're pleased to answer that question.
I would answer it now if the time permitted, but will obviously
do it in writing.
REP. LEACH: And this will be the last question of this round and
we'll excuse the secretary after Ms. Velazquez. I apologize; you'll
only have about four minutes.
REP. NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ (D-NY): Sure. I've been here all morning,
but it's okay. I will be submitting some other written questions
to Mr. Eizenstat. But I 'm pleased that New York was selected
as one of the first HCFA (sp). But I'm concerned that New York
City and northern New Jersey are designated as one HCFA. I understand
that criminals know no boundaries. But in my work I have found
that investigative resources should be focused where the heart
of the problem is. Criminal improprieties such as drug trafficking
and money laundering generate about $15 billion per year for New
York City underground economy. And, as you know, the New York
area, particularly Queens and Manhattan, have been consistently
recognized by the Treasury Department as in need of intensive
investigative action.
I just would like to ask you what stories, research, or statistics
can you point to that indicate the need for the New York/New Jersey
area to be designated as a single HCFA rather than two separate
HCFAs.
SEC. EIZENSTAT: Yes. We went through a very exhaustive study,
Congresswoman
-- and I very much appreciated your participation yesterday in
our roll out strategy -- to determine that New York and New Jersey
should be considered a HCFA area itself rather than designating
one or the other. This was very exhaustive, done inner agency,
done because of the following: you have an integrated economic
region; you have things like the Port of New York/New Jersey,
which is an entry point for much of the drugs and drug money that
come in.
We have an experience with the El Dorado task force, which is
a New York/New Jersey enterprise. And it was our belief that you
simply couldn't stop at the Hudson River, that this is an integrated
economic region and that means it's not only integrated for lawful
activities, but it is integrated, unfortunately, for unlawful
activities. And if we only dealt with New York we would only be
dealing with part of the problem.
REP. VELAZQUEZ: Okay, now, Mr. Secretary, will Treasury place
a limit on the amount of grants, funds to be disbursed within
a single HCFA?
SEC. EIZENSTAT: The only limit to what can be provided is the
upper limit of the amount of HCFA money we have, $2.5 million
this year, we've asked for $5 million next year. But there's no
particular limit per applicant.
REP. VELAZQUEZ: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. LEACH: Let me thank the secretary and also say to Ms. Velazquez,
we're going to have two votes in a row. The committee will reconvene
at 12:30, at which point Mr. Schumer will commence. And Ms. Velazquez,
I will turn to you first if you have further comments or questions
you might want to make after Senator Schumer testifies. Thank
you very much for your testimony, Mr. Secretary. The committee's
in recess until 12:30.
(Whereupon, a recess is taken.)
REP. LEACH: The committee will reconvene. And before doing so,
let me make a couple of announcements-- one, an apology to Senator
Schumer. Let me say that the committee protocol is that senators
and members go first. And it's my understanding that this was
not abided to in this circumstance, and I am very
apologetic-- and particularly so because Senator Schumer is a
graduate of this committee, he's gone on to bigger and better
things, and, more importantly, is one of Congress's leading authority
on the issues under discussion, as well as a number of other subjects.
And so I apologize to one of Capitol Hill's most esteemed representatives.
And let me just further say, and in welcoming Chuck that just
personally I'm always appreciative of having such a good friend
come and testify before this body. So please proceed as you see
fit.
SEN. CHARLES SCHUMER (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first
let me say I appreciate, as always, your graciousness and courtesy.
The committee had offered to let me testify first and it was my
decision, I couldn't do it at 10:00 this morning. So I very much
appreciate that. Second, I realize it's a lot better being on
that side of the table than this side of the table, having come
here and testified, because the schedule is such-- I've now, after
18 years on this committee, having a great time-- I have sympathy
for all the witnesses who have sat here and heard the buzzers
go off for votes and everything else -- and very much appreciate
that.
And, finally, I want to thank you, Chairman Leach, for your leadership,
your decency, your sense of both moving things forward and bipartisanship;
it's an honor to be here before you. And so I didn't mind. It's
great to be back in the same room, it's great to have all the
memories back, but it's terrific to see you as chairman as well.
I also want to commend you for your leadership on this particular
issue. It's not an exaggeration to say it's in good part due to
your efforts that industry and regulators are finally recognizing
the importance of money laundering. And I want to thank the whole
committee. It's good to be back in the old committee room even
for a little while. As I said, I spent many, many hours in this
room legislating. And some of the highlights of my career occurred
in this room.
I'd like to divide my remarks, Mr. Chairman, into three parts:
first, outlining the problem; second, a brief discussion of the
Leach/Schumer/Coverdale proposal; and, third, my comments on the
Treasury proposal.
First, the problem. Over the last year this committee has conducted
a vigorous and ongoing investigation into money transfers from
Russia through United States financial institutions that has cast
a sharp and indicting light on the business of money laundering
by U.S. financial institutions. It's important that we do everything
we can to fight money laundering domestically if we expect to
exercise leadership on this issue internationally. But the reality
is that the laundering of money through U.S. banks is really a
drop in the bucket compared to the huge sums that are transferred
and hidden in offshore banking centers located in places as far
flung as the tiny islands of the pacific.
It's in these mostly obscure places--like Vanuatu and Nauru in
the South Pacific and St. Vincent in Anguilla and the Cayman Islands
in the Caribbean--that much of the estimated $4.8 trillion in
hidden assets is stashed. And, according to Treasury's FINSEN
unit, nearly all of that money is hidden to cover up some crime,
whether it's the more benign, but still pernicious crime of tax
evasion, or the more ruthless crimes of international drug smuggling,
terrorism, organized crime, and the illegal financing of military
regimes.
The reason offshore banks are magnets for the lion's share of
illegal money is very simple, they offer a service that U.S. banks
and other reputable institutions around the world don't, total
secrecy. The common thread in these offshore financial centers
are not that they do a better job but they conceal better than
anybody else. There are laws that make it a crime in most of these
countries to divulge any information about the bank officers,
depositors, transfers, or any financial activity relating to banks,
to law enforcement, without exception. So a drug dealer, terrorist,
or tax evader who wants total inoculation from the law will put
his dollars in these banks, not in American institutions where
the risk of getting caught is much greater.
In exchange for total secrecy, these offshore jurisdictions charge
a fee. The island of Anguilla, for example, charges $60,000 to
open a bank, and $20,000 per year to keep it there. False credit
cards, bogus country passports, and even phony nobility titles
intended to hide identity, and even bestow a thin veneer of respectability
are sold a la carte. Today, Anguilla, with a population of 11,000
has 300 chartered banks. By comparison, New York State, the financial
center of the universe, at least in our opinion, has 154 chartered
banks.
The Cayman Islands, which has recently enacted stricter standards
in order to stem the flow of illegal money is still the fifth
largest banking center in the world, behind New York, London,
Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Did the Cayman Islands become such a large
banking center because of their proficiency at financial transactions?
Absolutely not. Did they even become such a banking center because
of tax laws? No. It's very simple; they become these huge centers
because they hide all information about the money that goes in
and comes out.
One of the reasons for the growth in offshore money laundering
is the Internet. The Internet allows fast, anonymous, and cheap
movement of money around the globe with the click of a mouse.
It used to be that if you wanted to launder money in one of these
offshore banks there would have to be some kind of personal involvement.
Now, on the Internet, there isn't. Typing "offshore"
into the Yahoo search engine produces 30,074 sites designed to
attract dirty money.
Again, type "offshore" into the Yahoo search engine;
30,074 sites designed to attract dirty money. And some of these
sites are incredibly brazen. I have blown up the web pages of
some of them so that the committee might look at them. One of
them is "WWW.OFFSHORESECRETS.COM." The blue one over
there -- I'm not sure the committee can see it.
As you can see, or as you will see in a second, this website offers
an offshore bank account in an unnamed "Baltic state"
and boasts that, "No country, especially not the EU or the
US have the powers to request or coerce information from the authorities."
And they note that, "The almost universal need for producing
documentary proof that you are a fit person to operate a bank
account has been virtually eliminated." And there are thousands
of these sites that say, yes, "Yes. I want to order my own
bank now." I think that's underneath the chart
-- the green one -- it says "offshore financial freedom."
And yet despite the fact that the nexus of every international
crime is money laundering, Maxine Waters -- I don't always agree
with her, but on this issue she is right -- very little has been
accomplished to stop it, mostly because law enforcement is on
its own fight to another country's domestic law; law enforcement
is just completely on its own. But the U.S. has leverage to compel
countries to change their laws. And the bill that you, and the
House, and myself, and Mr. Coverdale have introduced in the Senate
would apply that pressure.
There are three fundamental provisions in the law that we have
introduced that would give law enforcement the upper hand in combating
money laundering. First, our legislation isolates offshore jurisdictions.
Banks incorporated in countries with completely opaque bank secrecy
laws should not be allowed to participate in the U.S. financial
system or transact with U.S. financial institutions. Simply put,
there is no excuse for giving a jurisdiction that does not have
a mutual legal assistance treaty with the U.S. access to the U.S.
banking system.
Second, it expands the list of offenses that count as money laundering
to include corruption. By broadening the list, we can investigate
and take action in cases where foreign governments or dictators
seek to use financial institutions to plunder and hide assets.
And, third, it requires U.S. institutions to determine the true
owners of foreign accounts. U.S. banks should follow the same
diligence in determining the true identity of foreign account-holders
as they use with U.S. customers.
This provision has, more than any other, generated concerns in
the financial services industry-- some are legitimate, some are
displaced-- because of difficulties in determining ownership.
And whether these difficulties warrant greater flexibility in
the implementation is certainly an open question. But the first
two provisions, in my judgment, are not questionable and should
be the bottom line for any legislation we produce.
That brings me to the third issue here, the third part of my remarks
-- the Treasury Department's proposal. First I want to commend
the Treasury Department for their efforts to further this debate.
It is the first time since I was elected to office 20 years ago
that a Treasury secretary has focused so keenly on this issue.
And certainly the first time he has gone so far as to propose
money laundering legislation. I respect those efforts. But as
much as I was looking forward to the unveiling of their proposal,
I have to admit, I was disappointed. Not because I don't agree
with their proposal, because I think the proposal includes the
tools necessary for a comprehensive
(Audio break. Page 7, line 2, toward the end)
When it comes to money laundering, in most administrations a path
of diplomacy prevails because it's hard to find the strength necessary
to buck the interests that benefit from the dollar flow from offshore
jurisdictions. So unless we make it mandatory to cut off these
jurisdictions that flagrantly violate international standards
against money laundering mandatory, it's my guess that not much
will be done.
Despite my opposition to a highly discretionary approach, I think
there is a lot we agree on. And I do thank Treasury for introducing
a bill that we can use as a foundation to build on. I would hope,
Mr. Chairman, that you and I and Senator Coverdale could take
the Treasury proposal and toughen it up. And I look forward to
passing a bill with teeth in it that will put this $800 billion
industry out of business once and for all.
I want to thank you again, Chairman Leach, for your leadership
on this issue. You've been an excellent ally, a good friend, and
I look forward to working with you and your committee.
REP. LEACH: Thank you very much, Chuck. And your testimony is,
of course, exceptional. I'm obligated, however, to correct you
on a perspective and that is on "being the center of the
universe," I represent a state with three times as many banks
as your state. And by all the powers vested in me as a citizen
of the state with three times as many banks as New York, I would
like to say that we would be happy to sell you a title. I think
Baron Von Schumer would be very appropriate.
SEN. SCHUMER: I don't know how that would fly in Brooklyn, Mr.
Chairman.
REP. LEACH: Perhaps not well. One of the aspects of this whole
issue that is probably as extraordinary as anything I know is
the perspective that relates to statistics. That is, this is a
town that we've gotten used to problems but problems take on different
proportions based on size. And it's a classic, philosophical issue
that sometimes the difference in size can become a difference
in kind.
But if you take the country of Nauru-- I asked my staff to relook
at a figure because I couldn't believe it in my opening statement.
And that is that in one year $70 billion was transferred from
Russia through Nauru in a money laundering fashion. That represents
$640,000 per citizen of Nauru. More extraordinarily, and I think
we as a world community have to sit up in geopolitical, not banking,
alarm -- geopolitical alarm.
That represents 21 percent of the GNP of Russia -- 21 percent
through one island of money fleeing the country. So what we're
dealing with here is an issue that isn't exactly simply a banking
system issue, it's the banking system impinging upon one of the
great geopolitical traumas of our time, which is money flight,
particularly as encouraged by oligarchies in nation states that
have become "corruptocracies." And how do they have
a chance to make it in the world if we tolerate this sort of circumstance?
And I'm pleased to note -- and I don't mean to defend your administration,
Chuck -- but the deputy secretary agreed in his testimony today
that he would welcome inserting in their statute making a public
corruption a predicate offense for money laundering purposes,
which had been left out of the statute. And I think that's a strong
step forward and a very important one.
But this is an issue that impinges on the American banking system,
particularly in the sense that we don't want to see the practices
of foreign countries become dominant in our own society. But it
is at this point in time principally a matter of how you develop
an international system that works in a political and economic
way and, therefore, has become an issue in international politics
as there is. And that is an inconvenience for the American banking
system because all laws that relate to money laundering are inconveniences
but the importance is nonetheless staggering. And your statement
today I think summarizes that dilemma as well as any.
My crucial question to you is that if we in the House side come
forth with a bill, and frankly I think there's some case for a
little more discretion as a first step, particularly to achieve
the kind of consensus that may be needed to pass legislation,
but can we expect legislation to come through the Senate likewise,
and what do you see as a realistic prospect?
SEN. SCHUMER: Yeah, I think there is a great deal of interest
in the Senate in dealing with money laundering. As you know, Senator
Coverdale and I don't have the same ideological viewpoints, but
we've come together on this and received lots of interest from
both sides of the aisle in a really tough bill and I am optimistic
that the kind of proposal that we have made can pass the Senate.
I'd welcome the House sending us a proposal even if it doesn't
go quite as far as ours and we'll try to pass as strong a provision
as we can and then go to conference.
But one thing I guess I would talk about with discretion-- I mean,
some people believe that Treasury has discretion to act now under
a whole bunch of different provisions-- they have the suspicious
activity reporting requirements and things like that, and they've
never done it. And I will tell you, when I talk to people in the
bowels of the Treasury Department who have been involved in these
issues, they are the most enthusiastic people about taking discretion
away because they've lived through this. And this, of course,
is their lives and the government has to balance considerations.
But they realize that as long as discretion and particularly the
burden of proof is on cutting things off as opposed to against
cutting things off, it's going to be a long, hard road. And so
I think there's room for compromise. I know that some of the U.S.
institutions are worried about the beneficial ownership provisions.
I think those we can work out and I'm open to talk to people on
that. Where I feel really strongly and I'm willing to have the
fight on the floor of the Senate, and I would urge you to have
it on the floor of the House, is allowing the kind of discretionary
approach that Treasury has adopted to prevail, because then I
think we won't come close to doing what we should.
I would just say one other thing. I think money laundering in
this international, Internet world is going to get worse. I think
the kind of problem we have seen with Bank of New York, which
is a fine New York institution that got into trouble, is going
to be small in the next few years. So I'm confident that the kind
of proposal that Senator Coverdale and I have made here, and you
and me have made in the House, is ultimately going to become law.
And the only question is, when -- because if we don't make it
law soon, there will be other incidents, scandals -- call them
what you will -- that will importune all of us to act in a stronger
way than Treasury has proposed.
REP. LEACH: Thank you, Senator. There are no more panelists so,
Dr. Baker. We appreciate your staying and accommodating your schedule.
SEN. SCHUMER: And I look forward to working with you on this,
we're going to get something good done here.
REP. LEACH: Good. Thank you, Chuck.
Our third panel is composed of Raymond Baker who's a guest scholar
at the Brookings Institution; Robert E. Bauman, who's a former
member of the United States Congress; Kenneth J. Rijock, who's
an acknowledged former money launderer; and Mr. Jonathan Winer
of the law firm of Austin Byrd (sp) who is a former deputy assistant
secretary of the Bureau of International of Narcotics and Law
of the Department of State. We will begin in the order of which
the recognition was made and begin with you, Dr. Baker. Please
proceed.
DR. BAKER: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
REP. LEACH: Let me interrupt for a second. First, let me say that,
without objection, all full statements will be placed in the record
and you may proceed in any manner that you see fit. Please.
DR. BAKER: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you.
I am Raymond Baker. After a career in international business,
I'm a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and
have recently concluded a three-year assignment as a guest scholar
at the Brookings Institution, laundered criminal money and illegal
flight capital, passed out of other countries and into the United
States by the hundreds of billions of dollars.
To distinguish money laundering from parallel financial flows
it is useful to add the word criminal when referring to the movement
of funds that violate U.S. anti-money laundering legislation.
The term "flight capital" generally refers to commercial
and private funds being transferred from one country to another.
It has both legal and illegal manifestations. The legal component
is generally after tax money that is properly documented, it remains
on the books of the transferor, and is largely beneficial to investment
and trade. The illegal component is almost always tax evading
and improperly documented, and it disappears from any record in
the country of its origin.
Illegal flight capital, of course, has many forms, such as corruption
by foreign government officials, falsification of prices and import
and export transactions, real estate, and securities trades mispriced
across borders and the growing problem of wire fraud out of criminally
compliant banks.
I have studied closely corruption and trade mispricing because
both are dependent on international cooperation to facilitate
their movement. The lowest estimate I can make for just these
two sources of illegal flight capital is $100 billion a year,
a trillion dollars in the last decade, at least half coming to
the United States. A broader examination of illegal flight capital
would produce substantial higher figures.
The benefits and costs of this $100 billion a year merit clear
analysis. The benefit is that it brings that sum of money into
western coffers. The cost can be seen in the impact on both domestic
and foreign interest. One hundred million dollars a year or more
of illegal flight capital provides cover for a far larger amount
of criminal money laundering, estimated at $500 billion to a trillion
dollars a year. These are two rails on the same tracks through
the international financial system.
Treasury Department officials estimated to me that 99.9 percent
of the criminal money that is presented for deposit in the United
States gets into secure accounts. The easiest thing for criminals
to do is to make their criminal money look like it is merely corrupt
or tax evading money, and when they do it is readily received.
The domestic cost of illegal flight capital is that it removes
anti-money laundering as an effective instrument in the fight
against drugs, crime, and terrorism.
The impact of illegal flight capital is equally severe on important
foreign policy concerns. Russia has been impoverished by history's
largest, swiftest diversion of resources, $200 billion to $500
billion in a decade. Nigeria suffered under the world's biggest
thief of the 1990's, Sonny Ivacha (sp), with some $12 billion
to $15 billion passing illegally abroad.
Corruption and tax evasion were so severe in Pakistan as to contribute
to a coup de tete, upsetting democracy. In Mexico we have given
white glove treatment to high status criminals moving drug and
bribery proceeds. China already estimates an illegal flight capital
outflow of $10 billion a year, likely to rise. The foreign cost
of illegal flight capital is that it erodes U.S. strategic objectives
in transitional economies and undermines progress and stability
in developing countries.
For many years an implicit cost benefit analysis has suggested
that the inflow of illegal flight capital is beneficial to the
United States. I challenge any analyst to make that case successfully.
I've used the word "facilitate" in talking about U.S.
and European activities. For example, every known method of generating
resource outflows has been utilized by some unscrupulous Russians
working in cooperation with Europeans and Americans. The principle
device has been trade manipulation, whereby through most of the
1990's 100 percent of the payment for export shipments was retained
abroad. And today, despite limited reforms, exports are being
underpriced so that hefty kickbacks are still paid out of the
country.
Russia's problems could have been largely avoided through use
of the instrument able to prevent such abuses, the confirmed letter
of credit. The west should be pushing adoption of the norms of
the free market system instead of accommodating the aberrations
in the free market system.
Most of the money out of Russia and other countries is generated
transactionally. It is initially deposited into western banks
and then is frequently spirited out to secure havens. The question
to ask is, why should the United States accept correspondent banking
relationships and overnight deposits from such havens? It is argued
first that if we don't take the money someone else will and, second,
that a portion of these funds may be legitimate.
If the case cannot be made that these flows, mostly illegal, strengthen
our society, then a reversal of U.S. policy recommends itself.
We should accept no money from offshore financial centers and
bank secrecy jurisdictions unless their regulatory mechanisms
meet U.S. anti-money laundering approval. It is not in our interest
to remain the world's largest depository for dirty money.
As we distance ourselves from those who harbor ill gotten gains,
we must cease to harvest ill gotten gains. Four fundamentals should
underlie a revised U.S. position: One, rejection of dirty money
as a matter of policy; two, periodic reconfirmation of this policy
given to and received from foreign account-holders; three, consistency
of regulatory requirements and oversight; and, four, exceptions
made available to foreign friends in situations of potential violence
or political harassment.
The combination of criminal money laundering and illegal flight
capital constitutes the biggest loophole in the free market system.
Drug kingpins and global thugs thrive because money laundering
is easy and money laundering is easy because illegal flight capital
is cultivated and maintained. We will never effectively curtail
the one while at the same time soliciting the other. Success in
fighting dirty money can only be achieved when we address the
whole of the problem. Thank you.
REP. LEACH: I thank you very much for that very thoughtful perspective.
And just to make it clear that this body does want to hear diverse
perspectives, we 've invited Congressman Bauman, who's at one
of the most powerful intellects of anyone I have served with and
I'm delighted you've returned, Bob, and please proceed in any
manner you wish.
MR. ROBERT E. BAUMAN: Thank you, Chairman. I think that's an uncharacteristic
overstatement of the truth on your part in describing me. And
I want to thank you for accommodating me and allowing me to appear.
As you know, I contacted your office Friday basically because
I found this proposal so outlandish and audacious that I felt
that as someone who had some acquaintance with the offshore community
that I ought to avail myself of this occasion and come and make
some comments.
And I'm certainly not going to read my statement, by any means,
and I have to comment too, in the beginning, that I'm not in favor
of crime, I'm not in favor of tax evasion, I don't have any money
in offshore accounts -- I wish I did -- so I'm not speaking as
anyone with a self interest except as one who has now written
two major books on offshore finance and banking, I just finished
another one on second passports and dual citizenship. And this
is an area that I've been keenly interested in and although I
haven't traveled to many of these countries that are --
REP. LEACH: May I interrupt for a second? You've just given a
new book subject, the selling of titles.
MR. BAUMAN: I think they're available on the Internet, and I'll
be glad to give anyone the website if they'd like to order them.
In fact I'll give the chairman a complimentary copy if he'll promise
me that he'll read it.
So I come here with relatively clean hands. And I've really been
amazed at the underlying premise on which I've heard the testimony
today. It appears that everything that is offshore is criminal
in the minds of the people that are talking about it. Here we
are talking about setting up a system that parallels the current
State Department narcotics annual evaluation but in effect is
even more powerful because it would literally destroy some of
these countries if it were applied. In fact, Senator Schumer criticized
that current existing annual evaluation system and now you're
going to set up a new one, parallel, based on banking activities
rather than drug activities, which sometimes obviously are related.
I think this is a new form of colonialism. Many of these countries
-- I wish the gentle lady from California had stayed -- are countries
that have struggled to gain their independence from colonial powers;
the financial sector is a major part of their income, and I don't
mean selling false bank charters, I mean people working in banks
in the Cayman Islands. And, in fact, if they're so powerful and
have so much money, I wonder why they're not here today. I mean,
they may well feel that if they appeared they would be tarred
with the same brush as all the rest and came to defend themselves.
I should have thought that people from Switzerland and the Channel
Islands and other places, the Bahamas, would have been here.
And I must say, Senator Schumer's remarks to me were highly intemperate--
tarring the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands and others as dirty
money simply because they exist. I mean, there are many, many
thousands, tens of thousands--maybe hundreds of thousands, for
all I know--of Americans who invest in these places because there
are trust arrangements that help protect their assets; that they
do value privacy-- which they can no longer get here. And yet
all of them are lumped together before your committee in this
characterization as being criminal.
We have a process in this country -- as an attorney I learned
at Georgetown many years ago -- if there's a crime alleged, probable
cause has to be shown, an investigation is made, and then the
prosecutorial power have the power to indict, there's a trial;
at that trial there's a decision, and then if there's guilt, they're
sentenced. All these powers are, in this proposal -- at least
this business of fingering countries and cutting them off from
our banking system -- all of these powers are brought into one
person's hands, and they can be administered at the whim of that
person. I have great concern about that.
And let me say that I had no idea that Mr. Winer was going to
be here today. But I appended to my remarks an article from the
Money Laundering Alert. The Money Laundering Alert, you probably
are aware, is a very well thought of,
established-- it is the report card, monthly, on money laundering
around the world. The owner and editor is Charles Entriago (sp),
he's a Democrat, former Justice Department official, a large contributor
of the Democratic party. He's never been accused--except in the
Wall Street Journal--of some minor infractions himself, and his
newsletter is quite reliable.
And yet in the three pages that I append to my remarks it addresses
itself to the treatment that was received by the nation of Anguilla
last year at the hands of Mr. Winer, who was then in the State
Department, and others, literally at a time when this country
was trying to accommodate itself to the U.S. demands. It was subjected
to an alert that probably caused inestimable damage to their banking
system -- and without any chance to answer.
So I think that we've already seen one case, at least where questions
have been raised about this, and I see the possibility of this
multiplying many times over. And none of your witnesses -- and
I feel compelled to say this -- have given any credit to the changes
that these jurisdictions have made. The Cayman Islands have adopted
many changes under the pressure of the foreign office in London
-- of course it's an overseas territory. The Channel Islands,
which are in a different constitutional status as Crown Dependencies--they
have adopted many of these changes, and these changes are being
made in response, not to forces administered by Washington, but
by the general pressure to change the climate of banking worldwide.
And not all of these jurisdictions are narratives.
I say to the gentleman and the committee, and I hope they will
consider that there's more than one aspect to this problem, and
I know when you're in Congress you get wrapped in the jurisdictions
before you--once your committee has hurdled on it no one denigrates
the problem--but I think this is a major mistake and it will cause
us international problems.
I've never really understood why the United States has to be the
policeman of the world and now the bank regulator of the world.
And I think you have before you already enough laws to be able
to administer the proper punishment to those people over whom
we have jurisdiction without having to crush small nations at
will of people that are essentially bureaucrats appointed for
a period of time, not even without a Congressional say.
I thank the gentleman for allowing me to appear.
REP. LEACH: Well, thank you very much, Bob. Our next witness is
a Kenneth J. Rijock, who I have been told is an acknowledged money
launderer and now a cooperator with and consultant to various
law enforcement agencies. Mr. Rijock.
MR. RIJOCK: I'd like to thank the committee and chairman Leach
for giving me the opportunity to testify today. My name is Kenneth
Rijock and I'm a financial crime consultant in Miami, Florida.
I teach money-laundering techniques to law enforcement, and I
teach from the perspective of a decade of personal involvement
in conducting money-laundering operations for narcotics trafficking
organizations. In other words, I was a career criminal who disposed
of the proceeds of crime for my clients.
Although I utilized a variety of methods, the most difficult to
detect was the illegal export of large amounts of currency from
the United States to the tax havens of the Caribbean -- the so-called
banking republics. Located mainly in the tax shelter countries,
off shore banks offer the money managers of criminal organizations
the opportunity to launder funds with maximum safety and secrecy
at minimum risk. I know this from my own experience. Offshore
operations in the tax havens are painstakingly constructed to
make investigation literally impossible. For example, a narcotics
trafficker may own a corporation formed in the Turks and Caicos
Islands where the U.S. dollar is the currency of the realm. But
the board of directors live in the Channel Islands, the bank accounts
are in Liechtenstein, the company does business in Panama, and
the aircraft and vessels utilized to transport narcotics and cash
are registered in Sao Tome off the coast of West Africa. What
criminal investigator has either the time or the budget to untangle
this web?
In a free and open society we are unable to adequately police
our borders, especially where outbound flights and cargo are concerned.
Even if the United States Custom Service has 2 million agents
and we placed a web cam in every general aviation airport in the
country, money and financial instruments would still find a way
offshore and into the tax havens. I was never even stopped in
my many trips overseas carrying cash or cash equivalent instruments.
Money launderers are attracted by a business environment where
income, corporate and inheritance taxes do not exist, where there
are no exchange control laws, and where bank and corporate secrecy
laws prohibit even an inquiry into the ownership of companies
and bank accounts. For over 25 years, the tax havens of Antigua,
St. Kitts, the Cayman Islands, Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands,
and others have attracted elicit cash on its journey through the
wash, dry, and fold cycle of money laundering, placement, layering
and integration. These three separate and distinct phases operate
to enter the illicit cash into the worldwide banking system, to
move it around, thus disguising its true criminal origin and to
invest the sanitized results into the unsuspecting economy.
A typical money laundering operation consisted of chartering a
Lear jet in Fort Lauderdale, dressing up several clients in business
suits for a purported meeting in the Caribbean, and leaving U.S.
airspace with several million dollars with the ultimate destination
being the banking republics.
After a short refueling stop in St. Martin, a French/Dutch possession
that does not perform customs inspections on any arriving visitors,
we arrived at the airport in Anguilla, a nation which, at that
time, had over 300 banks for a nation with a population of about
8,000. There we were met by our local attorney who held the title
of constitutional advisor to her majesty's government, as well
as the following positions in nearby St. Kitts, ambassador to
the U.S., the U.N. and the OAS, as well as being the foreign minister.
Needless to say, we had no problem with the authorities.
Once formalities were completed, a short ride followed to a shopping
center of the type common to the tax shelter countries; only banks,
trust companies, and management firms, no retail or commercial
business whatsoever. The $6 million was deposited into accounts
owned by locally formed corporations in a jurisdiction where bearer
shares are permitted and corporation secrecy penalizing inquiring
parties with imprisonment and fines, with the penalty enhanced
for law enforcement.
Signature cards are passed out with bank advice that depositors
should not sign their real name. The identification of depositors
and the origin of funds are never brought up by bank officers.
Two former prominent clients actually visited a toy store and
used rubber stamps with the images of Minnie Mouse and Goofy in
place of signatures. The names on the accounts were the names
of these cartoon characters.
Certificates of deposits would be issued, the originals remaining
in the bank to keep them from the subpoena powers of American
courts. Bank statements were sent care of the local attorney who
was one of the bank's owners. The offshore banks, shielded from
American law enforcement inquiry, have operated with impunity
and with great success due to one feature, they all have correspondent
relationships with many of New York's major banks, allowing them
to deposit obscene amounts of cash anonymously and in the offshore
bank's name. The faceless client is never identified.
Funds deposited into these offshore banks are immediately couriered
to correspondent accounts in the United States where they earn
substantial rates of interest. In turn, the drug capital, now
comfortably residing as a general deposit of the offshore bank
in New York, is available to the American bank to lend out to
any credit worthy corporate borrower at competitive rates. Therefore,
the narcotics proceeds make a substantial contribution to the
profit picture of both the offshore and the American bank. That's
why there is such strong opposition to chairman Leach's proposed
legislation.
Closing the door on dirty money coming into the U.S. depends on
requiring offshore banks to maintain the same level of reporting
as is required in the U.S. thus forcing identification of the
beneficial owners. This they will never do as it: one, exposes
the criminal client to possible seizure and forfeiture; two, identifies
the client; and, three, violates their own secrecy laws. By holding
the offshore banks to the same standards as we hold our own domestic
banking institutions, we are not interfering with their internal
operations, or seeking to close them down. Rather, we are declining
to deal with them until they conform to established banking norms.
For those privacy advocates who see this proposed legislation
as some Orwellian intrusion into the right of the individual to
conduct business where and when he pleases, I reply: please feel
free to conduct your business
worldwide-- but know this, you cannot conduct business into or
out of the United States with institutions that do not meet our
reporting standards. If you want to exercise your right of so-called
asset protection and move your assets offshore to limit exposure
to creditors, ex-spouses, and the internal revenue service, you
may find you're traveling down a one-way street, unable to repatriate
funds.
Another reason we must shut down the incestuous relationship between
American and tax haven banks is the rising presence of Russian
organized crime in the Caribbean. As many tax havens allow what
are known as "economic citizenship," these well-funded
career criminals have been seen obtaining new passports, often
with new names unknown to law enforcement. We are not interested
in these individuals corrupting, influencing, or attacking our
domestic banking and financial system through the tax havens.
An additional reason for closing the correspondent bank loophole
is the proliferation of the so-called portable or traveling trust,
an investment vehicle guaranteeing total secrecy for the grand
tour with an additional
feature-- the trust document provides that in the event of any
inquiry about the trust or any aspect of its holdings, all assets
are immediately transferred to another tax haven, often at the
other end of the world. Therefore, no information can ever be
obtained.
Still another reason is the prevention of the rise of what have
been called "narcodemocracies" in the region -- the
total domination of a local government by successful narcotics
traffickers. The recent experiences of St. Kitt's are a prime
example. The passage of the Leach bill, which strengthens legitimate
banks in the offshore region and encourage their development thus
allowing support for emerging democracies supported by legitimate
commerce. Remember, we also stop international white-collar crime
from utilizing our banking system through the tax havens. Crooked
insurance companies would no longer be able to hide behind the
shield that protects against disclosure of their assets and lost
reserves. Nor could bank fraud be perpetrated from the safety
of offshore refuge.
The second major feature of the chairman's bill is the functional
elimination of the "payable through" or "pass through"
account. Simply put, a pass through account allows a non-depositor
at an American bank to exercise certain privileges utilizing the
offshore bank's account at that institution. I couldn't have created
a better vehicle for money laundering than this method, where
user identification is all but impossible and the user can effectuate
international transfers with little or no risk or exposure. I
recognize that many banks have already prohibited this type of
transaction, but we need to close the door on that form of abuse.
Make no mistake about it -- money laundering is financial terrorism.
To allow it to thrive in the United States will assist immensely
powerful individuals and organizations who, having successfully
invested huge sums in our economy, will begin to exert financial,
political, and even intellectual influence on our institutions.
We need to stop this development at this stage. Unless we slam
the door on the tax havens and deny them access to our banking
system and markets, we cannot expect to suppress money laundering
in the United States. If you want to learn more about the subject,
come down to Miami next month, sit in on the international money
laundering conference, and learn about the problems faced by law
enforcement and the American financial services community. Thank
you.
REP. LEACH: Well thank you very much for that revealing testimony.
Mr. Winer.
MR. WINER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Jonathan M. Winer.
I formerly was the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of State for
international law enforcement matters. I am currently counsel
to the law firm of Austin Byrd for e-commerce and financial services
issues.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee
again regarding your proposed legislation, the administration's
strategy, and the risks created by under regulated offshore financial
services sectors. Before addressing these issues, I wanted to
review aspects of the recent multi-billion dollar money laundering
case involving the firm Benex (sp) and its accounts at the Bank
of New York.
In the fall of 1998, in the course of my work at State, I learned
from the Manhattan's district attorney's office that Russian organized
crime figures were utilizing offshore money laundering mechanisms
previously associated with Columbian cocaine traffickers, involving
manipulations of publicly traded stock both to defraud unwary
investors and to turn dirty money into clean money. The money
trail extended into offshore havens in the Caribbean and the South
Pacific, as well as major financial services centers like London
and New York. I wanted to know more. The British government kindly
set up a briefing for me. I went to London and a year ago learned
of shenanigans involving a pretty typical money-laundering infrastructure.
An ambassador from a west African country was involved and passports
and various other permissions and members of the French mafia
were using it, they were working with a well known Italian financial
institution -- they were Canadian lawyers, British solicitors
and accountants, all dirty, and offshore banking in the Channel
Islands. It was interesting but it was all pretty familiar to
me, the kind of thing one sees pretty often in the realm of international
money laundering.
The briefing then took on a much more disturbing aspect. The British
officials told me they'd run across a company called Benex International,
based in Queens, New York, owned by a Russian named Peter Berlin.
Benex was a small business they said, nothing more than a couple
people with a couple of personal computers. Benex intersected
a number of ways with a money-laundering infrastructure the British
were investigating that had also apparently sponsored the U.S.
visa applications for known members of the Semian Mogliavich (sp)
crime organization of Russia. Acted and false receivable scams
with a firm known as WBM Magnets (sp) in large frauds involving
the Toronto stock exchange.
The Semian Mogliavich, Mr. Chairman, was and is a well-known priority
target of law enforcement agencies on both sides of the Atlantic.
Public accounts concerning Mogliavich describe the involvement
of his criminal organization and almost every major form of organized
crime -- contract killings, drug trafficking, prostitution, extortion
rackets, and frauds extending to a substantial number of countries
in western and central Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East.
Details about WBM Magnet's frauds and Semian Mogliavich's substantial
interest in the company were a matter of public record after regulatory
enforcement action were taken against the company in the United
States and Canada in 1998, leaving innocent investors holding
some $500 million in worthless securities before the firm plead
guilty to securities and mail fraud. At the London briefing, I
learned that the Benex's accounts at the Bank of New York included
not just WBM Magnet's activity but Mogliavich funds form drug
smuggling, extortion and contract killings. Benex thus appeared
to be part of the infrastructure in the United States that the
Mogliavich organization, among others, was using to launder the
proceeds of serious crimes and to commit ongoing serious frauds.
This in turn raised for me the question of the volume of funds
Benex was moving.
I learned that a Benex account at the Bank of New York had moved
more than $4.2 billion with over 8,000 transactions a month for
an average of one wire transfer every five minutes, night and
day, 24 hours a day, for 18 months. The company was just a couple
employees and a couple personal computers. I learned that Benex
was operated by Peter Berlin, a Russian married to a U.S. citizen,
herself Russian born, who had divorced her first American husband
after acquiring U.S. citizenship.
I learned that Ms. Edwards worked at the Bank of New York where
Benex maintained its account and through which Benex undertook
its money laundering activity. I learned that Ms. Edward's job
at the Bank of New York was to head the east European trade finance
department at the Bank of New York's London offices and that she
remained in daily contact with her husband, Peter Berlin, who
was still in New York running the money laundering operation,
Benex.
Mr. Chairman, my jaw literally dropped open when I was provided
this information. In the past I had investigated the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International, BCCI, and a lot of other big, international
money laundering cases, but this case had stunning implications.
It suggested to me then, a year ago, that there was a serious
possibility that Benex was a multibillion dollar money laundering
business operated by a couple of Russians, including one insider
at a major U.S. money center bank, and that Benex was, among other
things, laundering funds in New York City for some of the worst
elements of the Russian mob. In various capacities, I've prosecuted,
investigated, analyzed, or undertaken oversight of many major
money- laundering cases over the previous 20 years. I had never
heard of any money laundering case of this magnitude.
I also had national security concerns. I felt the lack of transparency
in Russia's financial system was closely related to Russia's crime
and corruption problems and the poor reputation of its business
environments. I was of the view that Russia's disappearing capital
had contributed substantially to Russia's economic problems, and
that the concentration of Russian capital, in the hands of a small
number of people, was dangerous. For several years I'd worked
with Russia's central bank and with various other Russian agencies
seeking to make Russia's banking system more transparent and to
assist Russia in passing and implementing effective laws and structures
to combat both money laundering and financial crime. Those efforts
had not been highly successful. If Benex represented a window
on billions of dollars worth of Russian funds being laundered
through the United States, a successful investigation could have
a potentially significant impact in making Russian money movements
more transparent, including the movement of funds embezzled by
Russian officials and oligarchs.
My concerns were exacerbated by what I heard about law enforcements
ability to proceed in the case. "We're not sure whether or
not anyone will make a money laundering case regarding Benex,"
investigators told me. "Existing laws may or may not cover
this case, depending on what people knew about the sources of
the money." I asked whether enough investigators were assigned
to the case, given its magnitude, so that the answers would be
found out. I learned that the resources were quite a problem.
There were a couple of people working on the case in the United
Kingdom and there was only one federal agent working on the case
in the United States, whom I later heard referred to by other
law enforcement officials as "tax force Steve."
"Surely
you have integrated databases drawing together and analyzing your
information," I asked. "Surely you have analysts working
for you," I asked. The answer was, "The British did
not, and neither did their American colleagues." When I returned
to the United States I took the information I received to senior
officials at the Department of Justice, to the National Security
Council, to the Department of State, and to other relevant components
of the U.S. government. To a person, neither they nor any of their
agencies had any information regarding the Benex case. If there
was an active case against Benex in New York, no one in Washington
had ever been briefed on it, including senior U.S. government
officials who considered the Semian Mogliavich organization to
be a substantial criminal and national security threat.
Officials at the NFC and State concurred that the information
on Benex raised potential national security and foreign policy
concerns, as well as serious international law enforcement issues.
We together asked senior Department of Justice officials to do
everything in their power to make sure the allegations were checked
out and to ensure that appropriate resources were devoted to investigating
the case. Mr. Chairman, I know I'm going over a little bit in
my time. If I might continue just for a few more paragraphs?
REP. LEACH: Let me say to you, Mr. Winer, your testimony is of
historical significance. You may take as much time as you want.
MR. WINER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to abuse the
rights, the privileges granted me by the committee. I'll continue.
Because of the magnitude of the money allegedly being laundered,
I had hoped that once Washington had been alerted to the case
the Benex money laundering operation would be shut down. I also
knew that sometimes ongoing criminal enterprises cannot be stopped
for a period of time while officials consider whether they have
enough information to bring criminal charges or to undertake regulatory
or other actions. I also knew that the Southern District of New
York had a history of not wanting the Justice Department in Washington
involved in its cases and did not always share as much information
with Main Justice as Main Justice desired.
At that point, my role was to take no further action but to await
developments and to seek updates from time to time which I did
seek repeatedly as did other components of U.S. government in
Washington, updates which were not forthcoming. As the committee
well knows now, the Benex and Bank of New York story broke in
the New York Times in August of last year. Peter Berlin and Lucy
Edwards since pled guilty to various federal money laundering
charges and are not cooperating with U.S. prosecutors. Benex was
indeed a multi billion dollar money laundering operation, the
largest such operation uncovered to date.
Benex did apparently handle transactions for many in Russia who
took advantage of its services to create false paper trails by
which they hid their money from Russian authorities for differing
reasons. Benex customers appear to have included a number of very
prominent Russians including other criminal organizations besides
that of Moglievich and businesses associated with important figures
from Russia's financial community sometimes called oligarchs.
Mr. Chairman, it's my hope that perhaps someday through one legal
process or another, the financial records of Benex will be made
public, even put on-line for the scrutiny of the whole world.
I believe some good might come of that. I believe there are lessons
to be taken from that case that may be relevant to this committee's
legislative efforts and I'd be glad to discuss them in response
to any questions you may have.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your leadership
on this issue.
REP. LEACH: Well, first, thank you very much. And I just want
to return to perspective on numbers because this is a town that
has a tin ear to the meaning of digits, that these two individuals--Peter
Berlin and Lucy Edwards--appear to have laundered $7 billion and
possibly more. We're not talking a few hundred thousand dollars,
a few million dollars, a few hundred million. This is an extraordinary
sum of money. And it describes the nature of a system that's come
into play of a criminal nature in one of the great countries in
the world.
And for our law enforcement not to be immediately attentive is
a mistake; for this Congress not to be attentive is extraordinary.
And I happen to think that-- I mean, one of our duties as representatives
of institutions of th United States is to make it clear that we
identify with the plight of the Russian people as contrasted with
concern for relations with any particular leader in a foreign
state or any particular economic organization in a foreign state.
Now, you have a background from the executive branch's perspective.
One of my ongoing negotiations at the moment is to try to get
witnesses to come before this committee, most particularly Mr.
Berlin and Ms. Edwards. The Justice Department is balking, and
I acknowledge some of this balk because they want to debrief these
witnesses, and it's for possible criminal trials. But it strikes
me far more significant than any criminal trial holding them particularly
accountable for any particular act is what it signifies for the
international system, for American policy, for American law.
And you're a neutral witness. Do you take the Justice Department's
perspective, or do you think this committee has a reason to seek
these people's testimony?
MR. WINER: Mr. Chairman, I've actually been in a number of different
roles in connection with this territory; at various times I've
been a journalist, a lawyer in private practice, a prosecutor,
a legislative counsel on Senate hearings on this topic as well
as my role in the executive branch. There was never an occasion
under administration, Republican or Democrat, throughout the whole
time I've been in Washington that failed to resist efforts by
any Congressional committee to seek the testimony of people who
were going to be witnesses in potential criminal cases. They do
not wish to have--and I've heard the routine many times when I
was staffing people in your position--possibly inconsistent statements
made before the Congress from statements that may be made before
in judicial proceedings.
Now, there are some very important difference, equities that play
here simultaneously. There are real law enforcement equities at
play which the Justice Department is right and proper to point
out and to insist upon. There are also substantial equities for
the U.S. Congress as part of its fact-finding and legislative
mission which are simultaneously at play. Here they may also be
foreign policy and national security interests at play. How one
balances all of those things in any individual situation requires
a great deal of judgment from the wisest heads available in the
particular situation looking at the particular information, the
particular facts, the particular circumstances in trying to balance
and weigh those equities.
It's not a simple matter to do so. I recollect when I was investigating
BCCI of the Justice Department negotiating with us, review of
some materials on the part of the case that had already been closed
and then more materials and ultimately a fair amount of materials;
but it was an extended negotiation. They are very, very difficult
equities to weigh. That's really the best answer I can give you.
REP. LEACH: In your testimony that's written you've described
certain internet gambling operations in the Caribbean island of
Antigua involving an institution called Swiss American Bank. Do
you know what Swiss America's connection with the Swiss financier
Bruce Rappaport is?
MR. WINER: Sure.
REP. LEACH: Whose name is obviously come up with the Bank of New
York --
MR. WINER: Yes, sir.
REP. LEACH: Is there anything you could lend both to the underlying
internet gambling issue as well as the Rappaport connection?
MR. WINER: Mr. Rappaport was the founder of Swiss America and
for a number of years was its owner. Public records in Antigua
suggest that he's not the owner of the bank at this time. The
bank's management has been pretty uninterrupted throughout this
period. There's been a variety of changes, but he certainly was
the founder of the bank.
The bank was used by European Union Bank of Antigua which is the
first internet scam bank on the internet, a Ponzi scheme to defraud
American investors run by Russian organized crime. Swiss American
was used to capitalize that together with funds from Mennatap
(sp), a Russian bank whose senior personnel also because caught
up in the Bank of New York's Benex affair. Swiss American, in
turn, was related to and has had accounts with Interim Maritime
Bank which is a bank which I believe was acquired by the Bank
of New York interim Maritime Bank was previously Bruce Rappaport's
bank.
What's interesting about the internet gambling casino connection
is that most of the internet casinos that I've found seeking to
have Americans engage in internet gambling seem to all use the
same facilities-- different websites throughout the web. I've
got a couple here. I've given the committee a casino on top and
casino on net. And what they show oddly enough is if you want
to do your casino gambling you pay your money to Swiss American
Bank in the name of a particular account, Intersafe Global is
account number, and then that money is handled by the correspondent
bank, by the correspondent bank of the Interim Maritime Bank Geneva,
Bank of New York, among others.
Now, what's interesting about that is that mechanism in theory
is a perfect example of concentration accounts or correspondent
bank activities where you have essentially commingling of funds
and therefore have essentially no way to be able to trace what's
going on. So it is potentially a significant opportunity to do
money laundering, depending on how it's handled.
Now, when I visited Antigua and met with the prime minister there,
we had questions about Swiss American because Swiss American had
been used by a drug trafficker whose assets had been seized by
the United States government, and the United States government
wanted the assets, and the assets disappeared. And we asked the
prime minister for access to records on the assets. We previously
asked him before-- this was the Department of Justice and State
working very closely together with the Department of the Treasury.
The prime minister said to me and to a senior Justice official,
"We can't get you the records; they were destroyed in the
hurricane."
Nobody else's records were destroyed, just the records belonging
to the accounts the U.S. government now had an interest in. And
this was money held at Swiss American bank. So if one wants to
rely on the records of the Swiss American bank and their integrity
and their transparency and their trustworthiness, I would just
remember that at any time apparently a hurricane can destroy those
records, thus making them unavailable if you believe the prime
minister of the country. That was the representation made to senior
U.S. officials in the fall of 1996, I believe.
REP. LEACH: I want to go into this internet gambling for a second.
Some of us have great doubts about it as a principle. You talked
about an element of it. Is it possible to do internet gambling
without a credit card or using Western Union?
MR. WINER: Sure. Any way this particular set of instructions on
the internet available to anybody in the world tells you exactly
how do it through Western Union, through credit cards, or through
wire transfers.
REP. LEACH: We are in the process of looking at legislation--and
I want to make this very clear--to prohibit internet gambling
using bank instruments, or actually prohibit the use of bank instruments
for internet gambling.
Would that be devastating to the internet gambling community?
MR. WINER: It depends on the regs, sanctions, mechanism of enforcement
whether it was adopted ultimately multilaterally as well as by
the United States, whether there was consensus in the financial
services sector that this was a reasonable approach. You have
to have such consensus in order for things to be both enforced
and enforceable over time. Given the magnitude of the problem
here, I believe it's possible you could achieve such consensus,
but it would be important to try to build it.
The multilateral approach this problem has changed enormously
over the past decade. I listened with tremendous interest to the
comments made by Senator Schumer because they reflected a position
that I previously would have held. I have been skeptical for many
years of the multi-lateral initiatives that have been underway
as too slow and as covers for nonaction. The last several years
I participated in relatively few of them. Much of my work was
bilateral or in other areas. These negotiations tend to be led
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. I have been extremely
impressed by the progress made in the past two years since the
Russia ruble collapse, the long-term capital management debacle,
the hearings you held on that which I think had a very substantial
impact on Treasury. And I believe at the concatenation of the
financial stability issues--Asia malaise, Latin American economic
problems, Mexico, Russia on the one hand, and the major money
laundering scandals on the other hand-- have created a real C
(sp) change in what the multilateral organizations are now prepared
to do.
I concur very strongly with the approach laid out by Deputy Secretary
Eizenstat this morning for that reason. I'm speaking in my current
vocation as a private sector attorney, not as a flak for the administration.
Simply that is my judgment. I believe that remarkable progress
is being made multilaterally and that it's essential as we continue
to move ahead unilaterally and bilaterally that we also move ahead
multilaterally given the fact that there is no difference today
between on-shore and off-shore-- except for one thing. Off-shore
is what you apply to somebody else's citizens. On- shore is what
you allow your citizens to do.
So off-shore is what you will take, the money you'll take from
other people but laws you would not apply to your own citizens
because it would be the devastation of your financial sector.
REP. LEACH: Well, I appreciate that. Let me talk about internet
gambling though for a second. As a principle, I don't like the
idea, just in and of itself whether it's perfectly legally done
with perfectly legal intermediaries. But what you are suggesting
with regard to the current nexus of internet gambling that there
are imperfect people that are in the process center of the internet
gambling circumstances. For example, within the United States
we've got a lot of laws that apply to gambling, and many gambling
casinos are owned by reputable corporations and individuals. But
it strikes me that the internet level offshore there's some imperfections.
Now, is that a valid-- that might be analogous a new Russian mafia
playing a role as contrasted with an old new Mafia from Sicily.
Is that a valid observation, or is it an exaggeration?
MR. WINER: No, Mr. Chairman. The same as my colleagues on this
panel, Mr. Rijock and Mr. Baker in particular, have both already
stated, the infrastructure used for money laundering for tax evasion
and now for internet casino gambling is the same infrastructure;
the same people use it. It attracts the same kind of people with
the same mechanisms, same everything. Guys and Dolls, Nathan
Detroit-- he's got the oldest floating crap game in New York.
That's where the action is. So what happens is, the international
bad guys move to wherever the oldest floating crap game in New
York has moved, and the jurisdictions Mr. Rijock talked about
are among the places where they go right now. It changes over
the years, but it's always there, and it does move to the jurisdictions
that invite it. And they do invite it.
REP. LEACH: Fair enough. Let me turn to Mr. Baker for a second.
You make a rather startling statement in your testimony that "99.9
percent of criminal money presented for deposit in the United
States gets into secure accounts and that 25 years of U.S. anti
money laundering efforts are a failure." That's a very powerful
statement.
So you think the new legislation that is outlined by Deputy Secretary
Eizenstat is a step in the right direction or kind of throwing
a small pebble in the big sea?
MR. BAKER: Mr. Chairman, another way of looking at the total problem
is in its three principal categories-- criminal, corrupt and commercial.
We have criminalized certain acts under anti money laundering
legislation. We are now talking about adding the corrupt element
to that and making corruption a predicate offense under anti money
laundering legislation. We still have hanging out there the commercial
aspect of dirty money. Either under the guise of corruption or
the movement of commercially tax evading money, billions come
into the United States as I said and provide cover for money laundering
which parallels in the sam process.
You said my statement was strong. I think the basic idea, th basic
fallacy in U.S. policy for some time has been an effort to control
the criminal element while at the same time welcoming the corrupt
and the commercial elements of these flows. We are hopefully putting
the corrupt element into predicate offense for money laundering
purposes. Ultimately in order to address the dirty money problem
we have to include the commercial element-- the commercial tax
evasion which is facilitated through precisely the same paths
in the international financial system.
I said in my testimony, the easiest thing for criminals to do
is to disguise their criminal money and make it look as though
it is merely corrupt or merely tax evading. And when they do,
we readily receive it. No, I don't think that we can effectively
deal with this problem until we deal with all three parts of it.
REP. LEACH: Interesting. In a recent op ed piece in the Washington
Post a chap named Matthew Brezinski who uses an offspring-- I
don't know if there's a case or not--of a former government official
argued that very little of this could have occurred without a
lot of advice from sophisticated American professionals. Do you
think that's the case, or have these money launderers figured
out things on their own?
MR. BAKER: I don't think it requires sophisticated advice by Americans.
On the contrary, I don't think the money launderers have invented
any new ways of moving dirty money from one place to another.
They have merely stepped into the same positions that have been
used by businessmen and bankers in moving flight capital for decades.
REP. LEACH: Would you agree with that, Mr. Rijock?
MR. RIJOCK: I disagree, sir, because without the professional
advice, without people with imagination who are experts at what
we call "disinformation," old wine in new bottles coming
up with new versions of the old ideas-- law enforcement is always
two or three steps behind. You were talking before about the internet
gambling problem, and I have a problem about it too. As a matter
of fact, law enforcement's major question is, is internet gambling
even legal for the purposes of the elements of chance? In other
words, there are a number of unscrupulous types who rig slot machines
in the United States. An internet gambling device unfortunately
has no checks and balances, and who's to say that the 55/45 split
that's common in our gambling industry isn't a 90/10 split in
favor of the house?
But let's take internet gambling to the element of imagination
that money launderers do. Why would they be interested in internet
gambling? Because it allows them to mainstream U.S. profits back
into the legitimate economy. I'll explain how.
One of the things that people in money laundering do is, they
stay up nights and weekends while all you people are home to dream
up new ideas of ways in which to beat you. One of the things they
do is, they fake accidents, use corrupt doctors, bring millions
of dollars coming into the United States from their own captive
insurance company to pay themselves tax-free money on a faked
injury and which, as you know, it's compensatory damages. They
pay nothing to Uncle Sam, and they have a $5 million seed capital.
They go out and buy an automobile dealership in Bethesda. The
problem with money laundering and the internet gambling is, all
a person has to do is arrange with an internet service provider
for a very large win, pay United States taxes on its $5 million
win. He has money which apparently was legitimately spun off from
a game of chance, and what's going to happen to the proceeds of
that money? It's going to be plowed into the United States.
Any legitimate type of a business that goes on in the United States
is perverted by imaginative people for money laundering purposes.
One of the biggest things that goes on in Puerto Rico is the abuse
of their lottery. This happens to a lesser extent in the continental
United States. Drug traffickers buy the winning lottery tickets
at a severe premium. They then come in and say, "Woop, here
I am, I just won the lottery, I just won $18 million, I know I
have to pay 34 percent in taxes, but that's fine. Give me my difference."
And right away I have legitimized and mainstreamed my money back
into the civilian economy, and right away I'm out of the drug
business.
So the problem is, in any legitimate business transaction there
is always a means by which you can pervert it and use it for financial
ends. And trust me that professionals that are involved in this
business are all very experienced lawyers, CPAs, tax professionals,
people with several degrees, and people with years of experience
in their respective professions.
I mean, I was a bank lawyer. I certainly didn't consider that
I had any kind of extraordinary talents. There are people who
have 15 and 20 years worth of financial experience out there drawing
sophisticated methods by which the law enforcement community hasn't
a prayer of uncovering the tricky tale around the world.
Remember that the problem with money laundering is that it's got
three separate and distinct phases, and unless the investigator
hits all three of them there's no way he can get back to the end
user. So yes, professionals do it. In my home state of Florida,
I regret to say that there are a couple hundred lawyers and CPAs,
all of whom have either done federal time or are doing time now,
for money laundering crimes. I was just one of them. Thank you.
REP. LEACH: Mr. Baker.
MR. BAKER: Mr. Chairman, I have never seen a money laundering
scheme, and we 're talking here about laundering criminal money.
I have never seen a scheme for laundering criminal money in which
I have not seen very much exactly the same thing done in the commercial
world. The expert advice that you're talking about being given
to criminal money launderers is the same expert advice that's
being given to people who are tax evaders and moving corrupt money
and what have you. The money launderers have taken advantage of
systems that have been in existence for a long time.
REP. LEACH: Mr. Winer.
MR. WINER: In the Russia context, Mr. Chairman, this was one of
the most difficult issues for policy makers because whenever there
were questions, which of this money is money laundering and which
is capital flight? it was impossible to answer the question because
the same infrastructure were used identically for both.
And given the questions about the legitimacy of the sources of
funds in Russia which is particularly murky, it became a very
intense ideological issue because if it's just capital flight
it's a creation of macro-economic conditions and is not something
to worry about; whereas, if it's money laundering it's a serious
law enforcement issue and you do have to worry about it.
And there have been years of discussions on that very point, and
I think Mr. Baker has illuminated that point very, very well as
has Mr. Rijock today about the distinctions that can be drawn.
Thank you.
MR. RIJOCK: Mr.Chairman, I just wanted to bring up one point that
we haven't yet gotten to, and that is the most important issue
about money laundering. Where is all this money right now? How
many hotels in Washington, DC are owned by narcotics traffickers
from Columbia? How many investment vehicles exist in this country
which have been perpetuated because of money laundering activities?
Everybody is always in such a hurry to go after the active duty
money launderer; he should realize that for every one that we
find there may be 300 who have successfully committed these crimes
and as such this money's already been mainstreamed or integrated
back into the peacetime economy and, as such, it can buy power
and influence. It can bribe and corrupt people, both in the U.S.
and overseas, and it can wield economic influence in any community
in the United States.
That should also be a priority. Where is that money now owned
by our major narcotics traffickers? It's not all in hotels in
Moscow. There's a lot of it here.
REP. LEACH: Mr. Sherman.
REP. SHERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think we'll be
able to make money laundering impossible, but we can at least
make it risky and make it expensive. As to making it expensive,
it seems that you've described two types of money laundering--
those where the money launderer pays the tax and loses a third
of the money they're trying to clean, and those where the money
launderer does not.
I think it would be particularly difficult for us to stop money
laundering where the launderer is willing to pay income tax. There
are a whole variety of cash businesses that any fool could run
and perhaps lose 2 or 3 percent a year on the money going through.
It's not that hard to lose money in the vending machine business.
And then all you have to do is add cash to that business and it
becomes a money making business.
All of our tax examiners are there to get you if you under-report
your profits. I don't know how often the IRS looks for the possibility
that you're overstating your profits. Likewise, you gentlemen
have pointed out gambling, and I don't know anybody who can't
go into a gambling casino and pretend to make
money-- whether they do or not. So at least in those cases taxes
are paid.
I want to focus the attention on these tax haven/bank secrecy
situations because here is a situation first where I think our
European friends have a tradition of accepting tax evasion and
bank secrecy to a degree that makes a mockery of the laws that
they pass for their own books. They have elections, they pass
laws that are designed to protect working people, middle class
people, allocate the wealth, and then they have a system of winking
at how very venerable families conduct their financial transactions.
I don't see how we can deal with the tax haven countries if--
even if we had an absolute ban on any transactions with any bank
or any financial institution in, say, the Cayman Islands or any
other country that had bank secrecy if the money can be moved
from the bank secrecy country to Britain, France or Germany we
obviously cannot ban financial transactions with Germany.
Do any of you gentlemen have an approach that we could take to
cordon off those countries that make a point of-- I mean, they
install the laundry facilities right there in their financial
institutions. Is there a way for us to respond that would not
require the cooperation of the entire business civilized world?
Mr. Rijock?
MR. RIJOCK: Well, Mr. Sherman, we have these rules already, and
we use them for other reasons. Why do we not trade with Libya,
Iraq or Iran? Because those are terrorist countries. What do we
do with those countries? We allow no commerce one way or the other.
We don't even allow our nationals to fly on their airlines into
their country. Why? Because those are terrorist countries.
Well, money laundering happens to be financial terrorism. In all
the years that I practiced money laundering, and I did it for
10 years, I used to sit out on the veranda in some of these little
countries and have a cup of coffee in 6:00 in the morning before
I went to the banks, and I used to look out on the horizon. Do
you know what I was looking for? As an old veteran, I can tell
you, I was looking for basically-- I was looking for U.S. military
to show up there one day. Do you know why? Because it's a direct
threat to our country.
All of the people that are involved in the offshore services industry,
from my own experience I'd say that between 80 and 95 percent
of the money in those banks is dirty money. I know from my own
experiences in Anguilla (sp) that the number of millions of dollars
that I had in one particular bank was more than 51 percent of
the total deposits of that bank, and I didn't know about all the
clients of that bank.
My point is that we have to take what we call drastic or radical
measures.
Nothing short of that will ever work. The gentleman's agreement
about perhaps putting down in your discretion, well yes they're
okay or yes they're not okay-- if they are to be called pariahs
in the financial world and shut down and the bank presidents of
these banks are to be indicted and tried in Miami for money laundering,
and if we're going to make some sort of legitimate commerce in
these countries rather than what's going on, we have to take radical
measures.
How do you take radical measures? Well, I'll tell you. There's
one other thing these countries have besides financial services,
and that is American tourism. Five days after we cut off American
Airlines flying into these countries and made it impossible for
our tourists to go there and spend their money these people would
be at our doorstep wanting to know, what can they do to clean
up their financial services industry?
Remember, these islands do not have any manufacturing, any industry--
light or otherwise. They are dependent upon financial services
and tourism. If you want to break the one, you're going to have
to attack the other, in my humble opinion.
REP. SHERMAN: Um-hum. I think you make a point. The concern I
would have is, you can probably prevent certain Caribbean Islands
from continuing to cover money laundering the way they do and
tolerate it. But there are countries in the South Pacific that
are far away from tourists. There are little principalities in
Europe. There may be, even if there's just one country that chooses
money laundering over tourism because for some reason tourism
doesn't work, that would be a problem. And I want to get to Mr.
Winer in just a sec, but the problem is compounded by the fact
that if we just prohibit financial transactions with a country
or two, they can still do their financial transactions with Britain
or Germany, whatever, and then move the money here.
Perhaps Mr. Winer first and then Mr. Rijock.
MR. WINER: This committee is holding hearings, I believe, next
month on the new financial architecture. One of the issues that
is under discussion as part of the new financial architecture
is the possible revisions to the Basel Committee's risk based
capital accords. There's a market opportunity here, self-regulatory
market opportunity. If the United States, for instance, on its
own or all the members of the Basel Group together--and this proposal
is, in fact, of the Basel Group--were to say, "Lending from
our institutions to an institution based in one of those bad,
nontransparent, noncooperative jurisdictions is risky because
we don't know what's inside that black box-- tax risks, transactional
risks, institutional risks, systemic risks, all kinds of risks
there. We're going to require the U.S. bank to provision more."
REP. SHERMAN: Of course.
MR. WINER: To provision more if it lends to an entity based there.
Well, if the major G7 countries, for instance, were to do that
that would create such a weight against the jurisdictions that
were worst regulated by the operation of the force of the marketplace
by making lending to them more expensive that they would relatively
quickly, I believe, improve their standards to international norms
in order to avoid the impact of the fact that nobody wanted to
use them because it was too expensive.
REP. SHERMAN: I would doubt that these money laundering countries
need to borrow money with the amount of capital flowing into these
countries is in their
own-- why would--
MR. WINER: It is not for sovereign borrowing.
REP. SHERMAN: Or commercial enterprises. There's more than enough--
MR. WINER: Long term capital management was based in the Caymans.
If there was a determination made that the Caymans' system was
not, had more embedded risk in it because it was less transparent
than the system that would apply in transactions onshore, and
if long- term capitalist lenders were told they had to put aside
further provisions for lending to long-term capital if it was
based on the Caymans, that would be a disincentive for long-term
capital to be based in the Caymans because it would make its lending
more expensive.
So this is not directed to jurisdiction. This is directed against
the entities that would be based in these jurisdictions.
REP. SHERMAN: So even if there's enough dirty money to finance
every hotel built in the Cayman Islands, the financial institutions
like long-term capital that ar borrowing money in Europe to invest
it in other places would be--
And the other thing I say, I began my comments by saying, we can't
end money laundering, but we can make it more risky and more expensive,
and I think your suggestion at very minimum makes it more difficult
and more expensive.
MR. WINER: This suggestion was articulated by Secretary Rubin
last April in a speech he made, I think, at Cise (sp). It was
the first time that I encountered it. I read it and thought it
was very, very interesting, and I think it was a direct response,
probably, to long-term capital management. But there's implications
for the money laundering area as well, because it would simultaneously
raise the cost of doing business in those jurisdictions and crete
a name, blame and shame approach which made them less-attractive
jurisdictions; so therefore would want to increase their standards
in order to get out of being in a bad list. And it's market-based.
You can do it unilaterally by a direction to your own regulators,
or you can do it multilaterally as a result of concurrence among
the Basel Group in Switzerland.
REP. SHERMAN: I hope it's an idea that we pursue with the appropriate
legislative vehicles here. I realize that the chairman has been
extremely indulgent.
REP. LEACH: Oh, I'm happy to continue.
MR. RIJOCK: Mr. Sherman, I'd be willing to respond to your question.
If I'm only talking about closing down the tax havens in the Caribbean,
why am I happy about that? Well, let's not let the Bank of New
York case distract us here. The Bank of New York case is an example
of the use of our financial institutions to move cash through
the worldwide banking system. However, most people involved in
criminal activity do not use our banking system in the common
manner because they know about our reporting requirements. The
large percentage of narcotics traffickers and other criminals
in the United States have avoided the banks in the past couple
years like the plague. Where do they go? They go to the non-bank
financial institutions which are unregulated. They go to the efforts
to smuggle bulk cash, and that's another law, out of the country
because there's no record. It's the old "take the money and
run."
We have a logistical issue here. From Miami, it's two and a half
hours to the tax havens of the Caribbean. It's also two and a
half hours to Bogota. It's several hours from anywhere in the
United States to the Asian tax havens and the European tax havens,
and it exposes the traffickers to interdiction and arrest. The
reason they go to the Bahamas, the reason they go to all the tax
havens in the East Caribbean, is because the law enforcement in
that area is minimal at best if it's not U.S., and they have much
more safety and security in operating there.
That's why I would be happy to shut down the Caribbean tax havens
and then work on the others from a different and less drastic
viewpoint. Thank you, sir.
REP. SHERMAN: I would point out how disappointed I was that the
CBI, th Caribbean Basin Initiative, providing massive trade benefits
to Caribbean countries, did not address this issue in any adequate
way. And we're in the process of providing trade benefits to countries
that shelter drug profits. But that's a difference piece of legislation.
I yield back.
REP. LEACH: Thank you very much. Following a little bit what Mr.
Winer was saying and just a slight correction that Long Term Capital
Management is headquartered in Connecticut. It's incorporated
in Delaware. But its funds were established in the Caribbean.
There is-- to add on to the secretary's point and some of this
frankly coming from Congress at the suggestion of the executive
branch-- but there is a huge legal risk implicit in that part
of the world if a fund like this had gone under that was never
compensated for it.
Ironically, there is a new factor that Long Term Capital Management
brought into the scene that no one has ever contemplated, and
that I call it "central bank risk." That it, it was
a central bank in the United States of America that determined
it should intervene in a given kind of way. I asked the chairman
of our central bank, a man named Mr. Greenspan, if he'd consulted
with the central bank head of the island to which this fund was
established. He indicated he had not.
But the point is, that there are lots of risks associated with
this kind of lending that I think should be accounted for. But
on the other hand, as Mr. Sherman indicated, Long Term Capital
Management is a unique kind of institution, and there are others
like it. But lots of the activities down there are simply transferring
operations involving fees from U.S. banks that are clearly of
a profit-making variety for the American institution and of a
tax avoidance opportunity for American institutions. There's certain
things they go down there, and from a safety and soundness perspective
they enhance certain institutions perhaps at the detriment of
the national interest. But they certainly enhance the institutions.
And so you put the regulator at a cross-purpose with safety and
soundness for an institution vis-a-vis what might be the American
national interest. And we have looked at, and it's several times
been raised in the testimony today, these distinctions between
tax avoidance as somehow being of lesser significance than public
corruption. But we have tax avoidance in the United States, as
we all know.
And we have this irony in the last several weeks that we have
a dispute with the European community on a tax avoidance scheme
using these islands that we're trying to defend at the same time
we're saying we want to crack down on tax avoidance. And it puts
our government in an awkward theoretical position but something
that I think this Congress has a lot of reason to be concerned
with.
Now, in this particular committee we have no jurisdiction over
tax policy. So it's beyond our realm of direct impact, at least
in a discretionary basis of issues coming from the committee.
But one of the circumstances that has come to light is always
the argumentation, if other jurisdictions don't abide by the rule
of law to the same degree we do we're disadvantaged as a society.
And then that applies to tax policy as well as all sorts of other
policies.
And that comes back to several of the remonstrations of this panel
that multilateral is a technique that ought to be on our concerns
at all times. And I just think it's one of the great issues of
democracy in the world today-- how governments can govern if you
develop techniques to avoid certain responsibilities and other
societies have them, therefore for a given kind of equity our
society should develop them or given companies within our society
should develop them.
And it would be far better if we just precluded them in their
entirety. Then the challenge becomes for a country like Russia
where tax avoidance is apparently the norm at all levels of society
how you develop a tax structure that is credible enough for people
to want to obey it-- and not only a tax structure, a government
that doesn't steal, because whatever the tax structure if you
think your taxes are going to go for the theft of a few oligarchs
what incentive do you have to pay?
And that is a challenge for that type of society that is rather
seminal. But I'm concerned that because these things exist in
fraud you get the impelling aspect that our society might have
to copycat. And that is a really profound concern that Russian
techniques come to be matters of course in the United States.
And then that when you look at the sums of money that are being
developed they're not trivial. We have in our country prided ourselves
in very small conflicts of interest. But it looks as if the criminal
nature of other societies are orchestrating sums of money that
could well be tempting in an American political system. Clearly,
they've had some sway in the American professional class. And
this is partly the case because we pride ourselves that everybody
deserves representation and that criminals deserve representation
just as noncriminal.
But I personally think that that is something that our professionals
are going to want to really think through whether they want to
identify with thugs and thugging techniques. Anyway, Mr. Sherman.
REP. SHERMAN: Mr. Chairman, just in response to your comments,
I think we should draw a sharp distinction between tax evasion
and tax avoidance. A tax avoidance can often and is often very
transparent. It is reducing one's taxes in a way sanctioned by
that country's tax code. And you pointed out the foreign sales
corporation which do involve establishing a basically shell entity
as I understand them, in an offshore jurisdiction. But there that
is not erasion. It is not secret, and it is in fact reducing one's
taxes in a way that had the support of this Congress when they
passed the foreign sales corporation provisions.
I realize we can all wonder whether every provision of our code
is well-designed. But I think that we should not mix evasion and
avoidance in talking about the issue.
REP. LEACH: That's a fair point from a legal and moral sense,
the distinction between evasion and avoidance is very real. From
a public policy sense though, I think we're all obligated to review
the issues and whether we want to have as much avoidance in the
statute as we currently do.
But certainly from a participant's perspective there is a radical
difference, and we have to respect anyone that obeys the law.
And that is something that is real. Anyway, let me thank you all.
I'd like to ask unanimous consent that members be given three
days to submit questions in writing. We have several requests
of members that might want to write a letter, and I hope-- you
are non-public witnesses, but to the degree that a letter is sent
to you, I would certainly appreciate your giving it some attention.
And Mr. Winer, I would also like to suggest and actually to any
of our panelists, we're looking at some legislative approaches
to internet gambling and perhaps you'd be willing to respond to
some questions we might have later to you on that subject?
MR. WINER: Yes, sir.
REP. LEACH: Maybe to all of you. Thank you very much. This brings
to an end this particular hearing, and the committee is adjourned.
END
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March 14, 2000